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I.
1. Introduction
Introduction
Estate planning with copyrights presents special challenges. Copyrights
different-at least for estate planning purposes-from
purposes-from other property
are different-at
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interests
interests in two notable
notable ways. First, copyrights
copyrights have aa defined
defined lifespan.'
lifespan. I
the copyrightable
Second, the creator
creator of
ofthe
copyrightable work
work has an unwaivable
unwaivable statutory
statutory right
Second,
of termination
tennination with respect
respect to any grant of a transfer
transfer or license
license of a copyright
copyright
of
made
made on or after January
January 1, 1978.2
1978.2 This termination
tennination right is exercisable
exercisable only
only
3
or
during a specified
specified time
time period,
period,3 and does not apply to derivative
derivative works4 or
termination right
exercising her tennination
the author dies before
works
works made
made for hire."
hire. 5 If
Ifthe
before exercising
right
the author's
but before the applicable
applicable time period expires,
expires, then certain
certain of
ofthe
author's heirs,
but
as specified in the statute,
statute, may exercise
exercise the termination
tennination right.6 These
These
termination rights
tennination
rights make copyrights
copyrights "sticky" for wealth
wealth transfer tax purposes.
Consequently, copyrights
copyrights are difficult to give away in a tax-effective
tax-effective matter.
Consequently,
Because
Because of the highly specialized
specialized nature
nature of their
their respective
respective fields,
copyright specialists
planning and vice versa.
specialists tend to know little about estate planning
termination rights, but it is
intellectual property
Intellectual
property literature explains
explains the nature of
oftermination
virtually silent on tax planning
planning for donative
donative transfers
transfers of intellectual property.77
Conversely, estate planning
planning literature occasionally
occasionally discusses conflicts between
the substantive law of copyrights,8g on the one hand, and donative transfers, on
1,
created on or after January
1. See 17
1.
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006)
(2006) ("Copyright
("Copyright in a work created
January 1,
and...
1978, subsists
1978,
subsists from its creation and
... endures
endures for a term consisting
consisting of the life of the author
death.").
and 70 years
years after
after the author's death.").
effected notwithstanding any
id. § 203(a)(5)
2. See id.
203(a)(5) ("Termination
("Termination of the grant
grant may be effected
any
agreement
agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.");
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement
(1976), reprinted
reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5741 ("The
H.R. REP.
REp. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976),
(liThe
provisions
provisions of section 203 are based on the premise that the reversionary
reversionary provisions of the
(17 U.S.C. sec. 24) should be eliminated, and that the
present section on copyright
copyright renewal (17
proposed law should substitute
substitute for them a provision
provision safeguarding authors against
LAW:
&JEFFREY
CUNARD, COPYRIGHT
also BRUCE P. KELLER &
unremunerative
unremunerative transfers.");
transfers."); see also
JEFFREY P. CuNARD,
COPYRIGHT LAw:
of
A PRACTITIONER'S
PRACTmONER's GUIDE § 7:5.2[A]
7:5.2[A] (2005) (discussing the scope of transfers
transfers by authors of
1, 1978,
copyrights). Transfers
Transfers or licenses prior to January 1,
1978, are beyond the scope of this
copyrights).
performer
discussion. In this Article, the term "author" refers to any author, artist, entertainer, performer
copyright protection.
or other person whose creative work gives rise to property
property subject to copyright
("Termination of the grant may be effected at any time
203(a)(3) ("Termination
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)
ofexecution
of thirty-five years from the date ofexecution
five years beginning at the end ofthirty-five
during a period of
offive
of the grant ....").
.... ").
ofthe
of the grant before
id. § 203(b)(I)
203(b)(1) ("A derivative work prepared under authority ofthe
4. See id.
4.
of the grant after its termination, but
its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms ofthe
other derivative works
this privilege does not extend to the preparation
preparation after the termination of
ofother
based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.").
....
for hire ....").
id. § 203(a) ("In the case of any work other than a work made for
5. See id.
5.
exercise the termination
of the author's heirs may exercise
(dictating which ofthe
6. See id.
id. §§ 203(a)(2) (dictating
6.
interest).
MER,
MELVILLEB.NIMER&DAVIDN
7. See,
See, e.g., KELLER&
7.
KELLER & CUNARD, supra
supra note 2; 33 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
11 (1996).
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 11
Intangible Tangible:
Tangible: Planning
generally Cheryl E. Hader, Making the Intangible
8. See generally
8.
Planning for
574 (2002).
Property,29
29 EST. PLAN. 574
IntellectualProperty,
Intellectual
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the wealth transfer
the other. 9 Rarely does one find a thorough analysis of
ofthe
transfer tax
consequences of copyright transfers and the particular tax concerns
consequences
concerns that arise
1O
with respect to copyright termination rights. l°
This Article seeks to fill that
void.
Part I provides an overview
overview of an author's copyright
copyright termination rights.
Part II explores gift tax considerations
considerations for three taxpayers: an author who
hoards copyrights (or makes no transfers
lifetime), an author who gives
transfers during lifetime),
copyrights
copyrights (during lifetime or at death), and an author who sells an interest in a
copyright. In the latter two cases, a gift tax may be imposed on the value ofthe
of the
termination rights that arise in an author's spouse and heirs. Part III
HI considers
the estate tax treatment of transfers
transfers by the same three taxpayers: the hoarder,
the giver, and the seller of
ofaa copyright. The tax consequences
consequences depend in part on
when an author dies in relation to the period for exercise
termination
exercise of the termination
right. Part IV attempts to reconcile the special
special property law treatment of
of
copyrights with the wealth transfer tax consequences
consequences of hoarding, giving, or
or
securing
selling them. Contrary to federal copyright
copyright law's intended purpose of
ofsecuring
economic benefits for authors and their families, the law in fact disadvantages
disadvantages
creative individuals. Termination rights cause
cause creative individuals to be subject
to more estate and gift taxation than similarly situated taxpayers who own
noncopyright property. Copyrights
Copyrights are "sticky" insofar as they are difficult
difficult to
transfer without attracting
attracting some wealth transfer tax liability-not
liability-not just with
itself but also with respect to the termination rights that
respect to the copyright itselfbut
arise under federal copyright law in the author and the author's heirs. Part V
copyright law to eliminate the (seemingly
proposes revisions
revisions to federal copyright
intellectual property
unintended) negative estate and gift tax aspects of sticky intellectual
termination rights.

9. See, e.g., Bridget
& John Sare, Estate
PlanningforAuthors andArtists,
9.
Bridget J. Crawford
Crawford &
Estate Planningfor
815-2d
PoRTFOLIos A-I,
A-1, A-3
1, A-36 (2004) (discussing some of the copyright
8l5-2d TAX
TAX MGMT.
MGMT. PORTFOUOS
A-3l,
transfer issues
issues involved in estate
estate planning); Ann Bartow, Intellectual
Propertyand
andDomestic
Intellectual Property
Consider When There
There is an
an Artist,
Inventor, or Celebrity
Relations: Issues
Relations:
Issues to Consider
Artist, Author,
Author, Inventor,
Celebrity in the
Family, 35
35 FAM.
L.Q. 383,401-11
383,401-11 (2001)
(2001) (explaining
how aa copyright
can terminate
terminate aa
FAM. L.Q.
(explaining how
copyright author
author can
Family,
license
Lee-ford Tritt,
Tritt, Liberating
Estatesfrom
the Constraints
ConstraintsofCopyright,
of Copyright, 38
license or
or transfer);
transfer); Lee-ford
Liberating Estates
from the
38

RUTGERS
109, 112
112 (2006)
(discussing the
the problems
problems the
the Copyright
Copyright Act
Act ofl976
of 1976 created
created for
for
RUTGERS L.J.
LJ. 109,
(2006) (discussing
authors
attempting to transfer copyright
authors attempting
copyright rights at death).
10. The
The two
two minor
exceptions appear
appear to
to be
be Jeffrey
Jeffrey K. Eisen
Eisen &
& Allan
Biblin, Estate
minor exceptions
Allan E.
E. Biblin,
Estate
10.
Planning
Clients in
in the
the Entertainment
Business, EST.
PLAN., Feb.
2006, at
at 26,
29-32
for Clients
Entertainment Business,
EST. PLAN.,
Feb. 2006,
26, 29-32
Planning for
(discussing
estate tax
consequences involving
involving copyrights),
copyrights), and William M. Weintraub & Burton
(discussing estate
tax consequences
A.
Estateand Gift Tax
Tax Planningfor
CopyrightOwners,
Owners, L.A.
L.A. LAW.,
LAW., May
May 25,
at
A. Mitchell,
Mitchell, Estate
Planningfor Copyright
25, 2002,
2002, at
20,
20-27 (explaining
the various
various tax
tax issues
issues involved
involved with
with the
termination of
20, 20-27
(explaining the
the transfer
transfer and
and termination
of
copyright
copyright rights).
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their property
general matter, taxpayers
taxpayers can
can make
make inter
inter vivos
vivos gifts
gifts of
oftheir
property
As aa general
oftheir
estate all
all post-gift
post-gift appreciation
appreciation and
and income."
income. I I
and thereby
thereby "freeze
"freeze out" of
their estate
and
This advantage
advantage is
is forfeited,
forfeited, however,
however, where
where the
the donor
donor retains
retains certain
certain kinds
kinds of
of
This
112
2 In such a case, the date-of-death
asset.
the
gifted
over,
or
control
access
to,
control
over,
the
gifted
In
such
case,
date-of-death
access
value
asset is included
included in
in the donor's
donor's gross
gross estate,
estate, thereby
thereby causing
causing all
value of the asset
n
13
post-gift appreciation
appreciation to
to be subject
subject to estate
estate tax. Thus, well-advised
well-advised taxpayers
taxpayers
post-gift
estate through
through an
an inter
inter vivos
vivos gift should
should
seeking to freeze
freeze the value
value of their estate
seeking
make sure not to retain
In contrast,
contrast, in the
the
retain any prohibited
prohibited access or
or control.'
control. I44 In
ofaa copyright,
copyright, this kind of
ofplanning
Because
case of
planning does not work as effectively. Because
case
termination rights, the
the author-whether
author-whether gifting
gifting or selling the copyrightcopyrightof termination
not be
be able to achieve
achieve the same
same kind
kind of "freeze"
"freeze" that
that is enjoyed by
by
may not
taxpayers owning other kinds of property."
property. IS From a copyright
copyright perspective,
perspective,
taxpayers
exploitation and, therefore, may
termination rights may protect
protect the author from exploitation
termination
viewed as a salutary
salutary concept,
concept, but
but they produce
produce discrimination
discrimination on the tax
be viewed
front that cannot be justified.
TerminationRights
IntellectualProperty
II. Overview of
ofIntellectual
Property Termination
II.
Act,' 6 a copyright
Copyright Act,16
copyright typically lasts for the
Under the 1976 Copyright
Under
of a work (other than a work for
creator's lifetime
lifetime plus seventy years in the case ofa
for
Until that expiration date,
1, 1978.
1978.1717 UntiI
January 1,
hire) created on or after January
copyrights are as freely transferrable as other property interests,'
interests,188 subject to one
andPolicy,
GRUT's: Planning
11. See generally
M. Gans, GRIT's, GRAT's and GRUT's:
Planning andPolicy,
MitchellM.
generally Mitchell
(1992) (explaining
761, 763 (1992)
11 VA. TAX REv. 761,
(explaining how inter vivos gifts can be used to reduce
reduce
transfer tax liability).
consequences of retaining an income
878-911 (explaining the estate tax consequences
id. at 878-911
12. See id.
interest for a term of years or life).
on Freezes,
Freezes, 2
Heat on
Putting the Heat
Mitchell M. Gans, Putting
13. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell
PROB. &
(1988) ("Prior to OBRA, Section 2036(a) provided that pre-death
& PROP. 12, 13-14 (1988)
transfers
... were beyond the scope of estate tax inclusion under Section 2036 even if the
transfers..,
eliminates this
death. But OBRA eliminates
the property until death.
in...
transferor retained an income interest in
... the
").
rule....
new rule
bona fide
....").
exception under the new
fide transfer exception
any
of not retaining any
tax benefits ofnot
demonstrating the estate tax
14. See id.
(providing examples
examples demonstrating
id.
access or
or control to an inter vivos gift).
III.B-C.
Infra Part III.B-C.
15. Infra
17
as amended
amended at 17
(codified as
Stat. 2541
2541 (codified
L. No.
No. 94-553,90 Stat.
Pub. L.
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub.
16. CopyrightActofl976,
(2006)).
§§ 101-1332
101-1332 (2006».
U.S.C. §§
hire expire
expire 120 years
work for hire
of a work
of the owner
owner ofa
17 U.S.C. §302(a). The copyrights ofthe
17. 17
whichever
date ofits
of its first publication, whichever
95 years from the date
creation or
or 95
work's creation
date ofthe
of the work's
from the
the date
from
that the copyright
assume that
all examples assume
Article, all
of this Article,
Id.§§ 302(c). For purposes ofthis
occurs first.
first. Id.
occurs
1978.
1, 1978.
or after
after January 1,
created on or
and one created
work for hire and
relates
than a work
relates to
to a work other than
or in
in
in whole
whole or
transferred in
ofaa copyright
copyright may be transferred
("The ownership of
201(d)(
(d)(1)
See id.
id.§§ 201
18. See
18.
1) (liThe
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work other than a work made for hire, the
major caveat: "In the case of any work
exclusive or
or nonexclusive
nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any
exclusive
executed by the author on or after January 1,
1, 1978,
1978,
right under a copyright, executed
otherwise than by will, is subject to termination
termination......
. ."9
,,19 The author may
terminate a copyright if she is alive during the specified exercise period for
20 If not,
of the author's
author's
giving notice and for termination of the interest. 20
Ifnot, certain ofthe
heirs specified by statute may exercise
exercise the termination right.
right.'21 Ordinarily, the
heirs who may terminate an author's prior transfers are the author's surviving
one-half interest in the termination right) and children
spouse (who owns a one-half
(who, together with any children of a predeceased child ofthe
of the author, own the
(who,
remaining one-half interest in the termination right per stirpes).22
stirpes). 22 If
If
grandchildren
of
the
author
become
entitled
to
participate,
they
must
exercise
grandchildren
exercise
by majority vote the termination
otherwise would have passed to
termination interest that otherwise
their parent, had their parent survived the author.2233 Termination requires the
24
right.24
termination right.
of the termination
beneficial owners
half of the beneficial
than halfofthe
of more than
agreement ofmore
owners ofthe
part by any means of
conveyance or by operation ofiaw,
of law, and may be bequeathed
ofconveyance
bequeathed by will or pass
as personal
personal property by the applicable
applicable laws of intestate succession.").
19. [d.
Id.§ 203(a). Some scholars have referred to this ability of
the author or the author's
author's
ofthe
heirs to disrupt prior transfers as "contract bumping.
bumping."II See,
See, e.g., Francis M. Nevins, Jr., The
Magic
Will-Bumping: Where Estates
Estates Law and
and Copyright
Copyright Law Collide,
Collide, 35 J.
Magic Kingdom of Will-Bumping:
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y
bumping); Michael
COPYRIGHT
SOC'y 77, 77-114
77-114 (1988)
(1988) (describing
(describing the history and process of
ofbumping);
Michael
Rosenbloum,
and Give Me Death:
Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and
Death: The Conflict Between Copyright
Copyright Law and
Estates
163, 166-67 (1997)
an author
Estates Law,
Law, 44 J.
J. INTELL.
INTELL. PROP. L. 163,166-67
(1997) ("In
("In essence, if
ifan
author assigned
assigned his
copyright during the first copyright
of Anne mandated
the copyright
copyright
copyright term, the Statute ofAnne
mandated a return of
ofthe
interest to
the author
author at the end of
the term, thereby 'bumping'
assignment contract
interest
to the
ofthe
'bumping' the assignment
contract in favor
of copyright
copyright law.").
law.").
17 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)
203(a)(1) ("In
of a grant executed
20. See 17
("In the case ofa
executed by
by one author, termination
author....
").
of the grant may be effected by that author
....").
21. This discussion
discussion is limited
limited to grants of a transfer
transfer or license of a copyright
copyright or of any
right
Id.§ 203(a).
right under
under a copyright
copyright executed
executed by
by the author on or after January 1,
I, 1978. Id.
Specifically, ifa
if a spouse
spouse but no children
grandchildren survive the decedent,
termination
Specifically,
children or grandchildren
decedent, this termination
right
decedent's surviving
203(a)(2)(A). Ifthe
Ifthe decedent
right passes
passes to
to the
the decedent's
surviving spouse.
spouse. Id.
[d. § 203(a)(2)(A).
decedent is survived
survived
by
by aa spouse
spouse and
and any
any children
children or
or grandchildren,
grandchildren, the
the termination
termination right passes one-half
one-half to the
surviving spouse.
passes to the decedent's
surviving
spouse. Id.
Id. The
The other
other half
half passes
decedent's children and grandchildren
grandchildren per
stirpes. Id.
stirpes.
[d. §§ 203(a)(2)(B)-(C).
203(a)(2)(B}-(C). The
The termination
termination rights passing to the children
children of any
any
predeceased
exercised only by
predeceased child
child of
of the
the decedent
decedent may
may be
be exercised
by a majority
majority of
of such predeceased
predeceased
child's
If a decedent
child's surviving children. Id.
[d. § 203(a)(2)(C).
203(a)(2)(C). Ifa
decedent is not survived
survived by
by a spouse, but is
survived
children and
survived by any children
children or grandchildren,
grandchildren, the
the termination
termination right passes to
to such children
and
grandchildren,
Id.§ 203(a)(2)(B)-(C).
grandchildren, per
per stirpes.
stirpes. [d.
203(a)(2)(B}-(C). If a spouse
spouse does
does not survive the
the decedent,
children,
children, or
or grandchildren,
grandchildren, the termination
termination right passes to the decedent's
decedent's executor
executor or
administrator.
administrator. Id.
[d. § 203(a)(2)(D).
203(a)(2)(D).
22. Supra
Supra note
note 21
21 and accompanying
accompanying text.
23. See
17 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(C)
("[T]he share
the children of
a dead
23.
See 17
203(a)(2)(C) (2006)
(2006) ("[T]he
share of
ofthe
ofa
dead child
child in a
termination
termination interest
interest can be exercised
exercised only
only by the action
action of a majority
majority of them.").
24.
("In the
a grant
the author
is
24. See
See id.
id. §§ 203(a)(1)
203(a)(1)("ln
the case
case of
ofa
grant executed
executed by one author....
author, ... if
ifthe
authoris
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an author's widow or widower
succeeds to a one-halfinterest
one-half interest
This means that if
ifan
widower succeeds
in the termination
termination right, at least one of the author's surviving children (or the
children of any predeceased
predeceased child, acting by majority) must join to effect the
termination.
Whether held by the author or by the author's heirs, termination rights
Whether
2s
exercised only during a five-year time period. 25
The window for
may be exercised
the copyright; if
the
ofthe
ifthe
exercise "opens" thirty-five
thirty-five years after the author's grant of
initial grant also included the right of publication,
the
window
opens
at
the
publication,
earlier of thirty-five years after publication or forty years from the date of the
27
26
Notice
The window then "closes" five years later.27
Notice of termination,
grant. 26
advance-and may be given up to
however, must be given at least two years in advance-and
28
ten years in advance-ofthe
advance-of the window's opening.
opening.28
Practically
Practically speaking, this
twenty-five and thirty-eight
means that, at any time between twenty-five
thirty-eight years from the date
of
of the initial grant, an author (or the author's heirs) may serve a notice of
termination. 29 After the author or her heirs give notice, termination occurs
automatically on the date during the five-year window that is specified in the
automatically
30
notice. 30
If the author subsequently
Ifthe
subsequently dies before
before the termination
termination actually occurs,
31
3
the author's estate. ' So if
an author gives notice
ofthe
ifan
the copyright becomes
becomes part of
twenty-five ofher
of her intent to terminate a copyright
copyright in year thirty-six, but
in year twenty-five
dies32in year twenty-nine, the copyright is delivered
delivered to her estate in year thirty32
six.
effected] by the person or persons who
who...
dead, [the grant may be effected]
... own and are entitled to
exercise a total of more than one-half
termination interest.").
exercise
one-half of that author's termination
interest.").
id. § 203(a)(3)
25. See id.
203(a)(3) ("Termination
("Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during
during a
period of five years beginning
beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution
execution of the
grant....").
grant ....").
26. Id.
Id.
27. Id.
Id.
28. See id.
id. § 203(a)(4)(A)
203(a)(4)(A) ("[T]he
("[T]he notice shall be served not less than two or more than
ten years before
before...
termination].").
... [the] date [of
[oftermination].").
29. Id.
Id.
30. See id.
of termination, all rights under this title that
id. § 203(b) ("Upon
("Upon the effective
effective date
date oftermination,
were covered by the terminated grants revert
revert to the author, authors, and other persons owning
termination
").
termination interests
interests ....
....").
31.
Commc'ns, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 859, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
31. See Bourne Co. v. MPL Commc'ns,
("Because
("Because [the author]
author] died after the notice of termination was served, her rights under the
70
terminated
terminated grant had vested and thus passed to her estate."), modified,
modified, 678 F. Supp. 70
(S.D.N.Y.
also Bobby Rosenbloum,
Reversion
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also
Rosenbloum, AA Very Welcome Return:
Return: Copyright
Copyright Reversion
and Termination
Termination of
Copyright Assignments in the Music Industry,
Industry, 17 ENT. & SPORTS
3, 7
ofCopyright
SPORTS L. 3,
(1989)
(1989) (stating
(stating that, where
where an author dies after notice of termination is given but before the
termination window opens, the copyright
copyright vests in the author's estate, not in her statutory
statutory heirs).
32. See Bourne Co., 675 F. Supp. at 862 (finding that a copyright vests when notice of
of
termination is given).
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The law of donative transfers
transfers generally reflects
reflects a commitment
commitment to the
33-the ability of
principle of testamentary freedom33
of
-the ability
a testator to dispose of
property
property at death as she chooses as long as the transfer does not contradict
contradict
public policy.34
policy.34 In that sense, copyright
of wills
copyright law is consistent with the law ofwills
and trusts. An author may make testamentary
testamentary transfers of copyrights
copyrights or
or
interests in copyrights
free
from
any
claim
by
statutory
heirs
to
terminate
the
copyrights
35
transfer. 35
copyrights only
Heirs may challenge
challenge death-time dispositions
dispositions of copyrights
through
through a standard
standard will contest (or possibly a separate
separate claim of tortious
interference).36
interference).36
With respect to lifetime transfers, copyright law takes a position that is
commitment to free transfer, or even vigorous
inconsistent with a commitment
vigorous property
property
copyrights or
ofcopyrights
ownership. An author and the author's heirs may revisit grants of
interests in copyrights once
once the intellectual
intellectual property's
property's value has been
37
37
established in the marketplace.
Practically
speaking,
termination rights over
marketplace. Practically
over
of revocation in the author's hands, or a
lifetime transfers thus operate as a right ofrevocation
"bumps") 388 any and all
veto right in the heirs' hands. Termination trumps (or "bumps"i
39
if
prior agreements or promises. The property then re-vests in the author, if
33. According to the Restatement (Third) ofProperty,
of Property, the purpose ofthe
of the law ofdonative
of donative
RESTATEMENT (THnm)
(THIRD) OF PROP.:
AND
transfers is to "facilitate rather than regulate."
regulate." See RESTATEMENT
PROP.: WILLS
WILLSAND
OTHER DONATNE
DONATIVE TRANSFERS
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (2003)
OTIlER
(2003) ("American law curtails freedom of
of
achieve a purpose
disposition only to the extent
extent that the donor attempts to make a disposition or achieve
law.").
that is prohibited
prohibited or restricted by an overriding rule of
oflaw.").
34. A bequest
bequest conditioned on a beneficiary's
beneficiary's divorce from a current
current spouse is an example
example
of aa transfer
transfer that offends
offends public
public policy.
policy. See RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
of
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
DONATNE
TRANSFERS §§ 7.1 (1983)
(1983) ("An
("An otherwise
TRANSFERS
otherwise effective
effective restriction in a donative
donative transfer...
transfer ... designed
to permit the acquisition
acquisition or retention of...
of ... property
property by the transferee only in the event
event of a
separation
separation or divorce..,
divorce ... is invalid, unless the dominant
dominant motive of the transferor
transferor is to provide
support in the event of separation
separation or divorce
").
divorce ....
....").
35.
rights apply
apply to
to transfers
transfers executed
executed by the grantor "otherwise
"otherwise than by will."
will."
35. Termination
Termination rights
an author dies owning a copyright,
17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006). Indeed, if
ifan
copyright, without ever having
having
assigned an interest
anyone, the author is free to dispose of that copyright as he or she
she
interest in it to anyone,
chooses. Id.
Id.
DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
& ESTATES 141-94,
141-94, 199-235
199-235 (7th ed.
36. See JESSE DUKEMINIER
AL., WILLS, TRUSTS &
2005)
(noting common
common grounds for a will contest,
2005) (noting
contest, such as defects in the execution,
execution, lack of
of
mental capacity,
capacity, undue influence, fraud, and duress).
duress).
& STEPHEN M. McJOHN,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
37. See JAY DRATLER,
DRATLER, JR. &
McJOHN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW:
LAW:
COMMERCIAL
CREATIVE AND
AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY §
§ 6.04(A)[1]
COMMERCIAL CREATNE
6.04(A)[I] (2008) ("By
("By allowing
allowing
copyright
and licenses
after aa number
number of years,
years ....
copyright grants and
licenses to be terminated
terminated after
... the statute lets
authors
their statutory
successors recoup
the commercial
commercial value
value ofworks
ofworks whose
true
authors and
and their
statutory successors
recoup more
more of
ofthe
whose true
value emerges in time.").
38. See Nevins, supra
supra note 19, at 77 (defining the term
term "bumps").
17 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 203(a)(5)
203(a)(5) ("Termination
("Termination ofthe
of the grant may be effected
effected notwithstanding
notwithstanding
39. See 17
any agreement
agreement to the
the contrary
contrary ....").
...."). The notice must comply in content and form with rules
promulgated
Register of Copyrights and a copy of the termination
termination notice must be
promulgated by the Register
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living, or if not, the author's heirs--even
heirs-even those who did not join in
4400 the
rights.
termination
the
of
ownership
their
to
proportion
termination-in
termination-in proportion to their ownership of the termination rights.
The copyright law might appear to offer more protection for testamentary
testamentary
transfers than for inter vivos transfers,
transfers, insofar as heirs have limited grounds to
challenge
challenge an author's death-time
death-time transfers. Heirs have an almost unconstrained
4' This discrepancy
ability to terminate
lifetime
transfers. 41
especially odd
terminate
is especially
given that the law demands less, in terms of mental capacity, from one who
executes
executes a will than from one who enters into a contract (or makes a gift)
42
during
But in fact, both the law of wills and trusts and the law of
of
during lifetime.42
copyright
share
the
goal
of
minimizing
the
likelihood
of
an
economically
copyright
economically
disastrous lifetime transfer. The law of
donative transfers does this by requiring
ofdonative
consequences of her
understanding the economic
economic consequences
that a person be capable
capable of understanding
43
actions.43
Copyright law accomplishes
accomplishes this by theorizing
theorizing copyright interests as
commercially. 44
usually commercially.44
exploited, usually
accurate valuation
unsusceptible
unsusceptible to accurate
valuation until
until exploited,
Thus all lifetime
of copyright interests are worthy of suspicion, if not
lifetime transfers
transfers ofcopyright
45
45
inherently
inherently unstable.
Termination rights are the copyright law's protection against transactions
that are grossly unfair to the author. 446 In the parts that follow, we examine
recorded
Id. § 203(a)(4)(A).
recorded in the Copyright
Copyright Office
Office in order to take effect later. Id.
40. See id.
of termination, all rights under this title that
id. § 203(b) ("Upon the effective date oftennination,
were covered by the terminated
tenninated grants revert to the author, authors, and other persons owning
termination
.. ").
termination interests.
interests ....
It).
41.
See
Tritt,
supra
an author
of copyright interests
41.
supra note 9, at 173 ("If
("Ifan
author makes
makes lifetime
lifetime gifts ofcopyright
and dies before the termination
statutory heirs may potentially
tennination rights vest in the author, the statutory
potentially
bump these lifetime
lifetime gifts.").
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
(TIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
AND OTHER
OrnER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
testamentary capacity
capacity
§ 8.1
8.1 (c) (2003)
(2003) (stating that, to make a lifetime gift, a transferor must have testamentary
"plus"-the capacity
for "understanding
"understanding the
effect that
that the
financial
"plus"-the
capacity for
the effect
the gift
gift may
may have
have on the future fmancial
of the donor and of
anyone who may be dependent
dependent on the donor"); see also
also Lee v. Lee,
security ofthe
ofanyone
713, 715 (Miss. 1976)
337
337 So. 2d 713,
1976) (holding that the testator had mental ability to execute a valid
will, but not to make a valid
conveyance of real property).
valid lifetime
lifetime conveyance
43. See DUKEMINIER
DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
AL., supra
supra note 36, at 145-46
145-46 (finding that to make a donative
transfer, an individual must "meet all of the elements
elements for making a will" and understand
understand the
consequences ofthe
of the transfer).
financial consequences
44. See generally
& McJoHN,
MCJOHN, supra
generally DRATLER &
supra note 37.
45. See Jane B. Baron, Gifts,
Gifts, Bargains,
155, 157
(1989) ("Despite
Bargains, andForm,
and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155,
157 (1989)
the benevolent motives and family settings usually
accepted
usually associated with gifts, the accepted
justification for formality
fonnality assumes that, in giving, people are fundamentally unreliable and
and
deceitful.").
deceitful.
It).
46. Copyright law does not permit
permit the author or the author's heirs to relinquish, transfer,
or trade their termination
203(a)(5) (2006) ("Tennination
("Termination ofthe
of the grant
termination rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5)
may be effected
effected notwithstanding any agreement
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement
agreement to make
REP. No. 94-1476, 124 (1976)
(1976) ("A provision
provision
a will or to make any future grant."); see also H.R. REp.
of this sort is needed because
because of the unequal bargaining
bargaining position of authors, resulting in part
part
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three scenarios of interest from a gift tax perspective
perspective and then from an estate
tax perspective. An author with a copyright created by her may retain the
property, making no lifetime
lifetime transfers; she may gratuitously give the property
away; or she may sell or license the copyright. We call these authors hoarders,
givers, and sellers, respectively. Each faces wealth transfer tax rules with
different-and often unpredictable-results.
different-and
unpredictable-results.
III.
Taxation ofCopyright
of Copyright Interests
III. Gift Taxation
Interests
A.
Gift, No Tax
A. The Hoarding
Hoarding Author: No Gift,
Tax
perspective, the simplest scenario involves
From a gift tax perspective,
involves an author who
during her lifetime. Generally
Generally speaking,
makes no transfers of copyrights during
property transferred
transferred by gift during a calendar
calendar
I.R.C. § 2501 imposes a tax on all property
47
47
year by any individual.
A
gift
is any disposition of property "for a
individua1.
consideration to the extent that the value of the property transferred by the
consideration
the consideration
given
ofthe
consideration given
donor exceeds the value in money or money's worth of
48
therefor.,,,48
Gifts of property
property having a value less than or equal
equal to the annual
therefor.
exclusion amount ($13,000
($13,000 in 2009 and 2010) are not subject to taxation.4499
of
Each citizen
citizen or resident
resident of the United States has a cumulative credit
credit of
50
$1,000,000 against the gift tax. so
$1,000,000
So a "hoarding" author, one who makes no
property transfers during lifetime, should owe no gift tax. But in the hands of
of
an author who gives or sells an interest in a copyright, the copyright is "sticky"
and potentially can result in transfer-tax
transfer-tax complications.

determining a work's value until it has been exploited.").
exploited.").
from the impossibility of detennining
(a)(1) (2006) ("A tax ...
... is hereby imposed for each calendar year
47. See I.R.C. § 2501
250 I(a)(l)(2006)("A
calendar year by any individual
individual resident or
on the transfer of property by gift during such calendar
or
nonresident."). A donative
donative transfer
transfer by an author of a copyright with respect to which no other
straightforward from a gift and estate tax perspective.
grants or licenses have been made is fairly straightforward
perspective.
Tax is imposed on the fair market
generally id.
id. § 2501
market value of the property transferred. See generally
id. § 2512(b) (declaring
(imposing gift tax); id.
(declaring the method for valuing
valuing gifts); id.
id. § 2001 (imposing
(imposing
id. § 2031 (defining
estate tax); id.
(defining the gross estate).
48. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8
(1992).
25.2512-8 (1992).
2503(b)(1) (explaining
(explaining that gifts up to the statutory limit shall not be
49. See I.R.C. § 2503(b)(I)
considered "taxable gifts"). For the inflation adjustment, see Rev. Proc. 2009-50,
2009-50, 2009-45
I.R.B. 617 ("For
$13,000 of
gifts to any person
("For calendar year 2010, the first $13,000
ofgifts
person (other
(other than gifts of
of
future interests in property) are not included in the total amount of taxable
taxable gifts under § 2503
made during that year.").
year.").
50. See I.R.C. § 2505(a)(l)
2505(a)(1) (allowing the $1,000,000
$1,000,000 cumulative
cumulative credit).
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B. The Giving Author and
and the Repetitive
Repetitive Gift Syndrome
B.
Any lifetime transfer
copyright-whether gratuitous
gratuitous or not-gives
transfer of a copyright-whether
rise to termination rights in the grantor and certain
heirs."'51
certain statutorily designated heirs.
termination rights operate
In the vocabulary of wills and trusts, these termination
operate as timedelayed
delayed and time-limited rights of revocation held first by the author and then
by the author's heirs.
ofaa copyright, then, gives rise to three
heirs.522 So a lifetime gift of
distinct interests: the transferee's interest in the copyright, the author's
author's
53
termination
heirs' (contingent) termination rights.53
termination rights, and the heirs'
1. General
GeneralRules Applicable
Applicable to Gifts
Gifts
1.
Consider first a scenario
scenario in which an author transfers a copyright without
consideration
consideration to a third-party
third-party donee:

Hypothetical
1. Author is married
Hypothetical 1.
married and has two adult children. Author
already applied his maximum unified credit to prior lifetime transfers. On
January
1, 2009, each of Author and his wife made a $13,000
$13,000 annual
January 1,
exclusion cash gift to Person
Person B, an unrelated third party. Author is the
exclusion
creator
$20,000. On
ofaa copyright having a fair market value of
of$20,000.
On
creator and owner of
February 1,
1,2009, Author gives the copyright to Person
PersonB and receives no
February
consideration in return.
$13,000 are protected by the annual exclusion and are not
The cash gifts of $13,000
s14 But when Author subsequently
subsequently gives the copyright to
subject to gift tax. 54
55 the transfer is
Person
Person B, even ifAuthor and his spouse agree to split the gift,
gift,s5
is

51. Supra
Supra notes 18-24 and accompanying
accompanying text.
51.
II (discussing
52. See supra
supra Part II
(discussing termination
termination rights as having the effect of revocation
revocation
rights).
Supra notes 18-24 and accompanying
accompanying text.
53. Supra
2503(b)(1) (2006) ("[I]n
("[I1n the case of gifts...
$10,000 of such
54. See I.R.C. § 2503(b)(I)
gifts ... the first $10,000
of
gifts to such person
person shall not, for purposes
purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total amount of
gifts made during such year.").
id. § 2513(a)(I)
2513(a)(1) ("A
("A gift made by one spouse to any person other than his spouse
55. See id.
shall..,
... be considered as made one-half
one-half by him and one-half by his spouse.").
spouse."). Gift splitting
shall
tax
requires the nondonor spouse to indicate
indicate his or her consent
consent on the donor's
donor's timely filed gift tax
2513(a)(1)] shall apply only if both spouses have
return. Id.
Id. § 2513(a)(2)
2513(a)(2) ("[I.R.C. § 2513(a)(I)]
have
signified...
also Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-2(a)(1)
1983)
... their
their consent.");
consent."); see also
25.2513-2(a)(I) (as amended
amended in 1983)
signified
of I.R.C. § 2513 is sufficient if the consent of the
the
(explaining that consent to the application ofI.R.C.
husband is signified on the wife's return (and vice-versa), each spouse signifies consent on their
of the returns). Only when
when each spouse is either
either a citizen
own return, or both
both signify it on one ofthe
or resident of the United States at the time of the transfer may spouses gift-split. I.R.C.
2513(a)(1).
§ 2513(a)(l).
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56 Author has no remaining
taxable. 56
remaining unified credit to "shelter" the subsequent
subsequent
57
gift, thus causing the gift to produce
produce a gift tax liability.
liability.57
What is the value of
of
the transfer for gift tax purposes? At initial glance,
glance, Author appears to make a
gift ofa
of a copyright worth $20,000. On closer examination, the situation is more
complex.
PersonB the copyright on February
1, 2009, federal
When Author gives Person
February 1,
59 a right to terminate the
58
copyright
and Author's
Author's heirs59
copyright law creates in Author
AuthoySs
transfer to Person
Person B. Prior to the gift from Author to Person
Person B, these
60
60
termination
rights
did
not
exist.
In
the
case
of
Hypothetical
termination
ofHypothetical 1,
I , the rights may
61 Exercise
be exercised
exercised beginning on February
1, 2044, until February
1, 2049.
2049.61 Exercise
February 1,2044,
February 1,
PersonB-at any time after February 1,
1,
may be effectuated
effectuated by delivering to Person
commencement of
the exercise period), but no later
2034 (ten years before
before the commencement
ofthe
than February 1,
1, 2042 (two years prior to the expiration of the exercise
2
6
period)
periodt1-written
-written notice of the intent to exercise the termination right.
Termination then would occur automatically
automatically at the time specified in the notice
63 If Author were to die without exercising his termination
of exercise.63
termination rights
but before they have expired, then his surviving widow and adult children
exercise-the termination interest. 64
would own-and they could exercise--the

56. Supra
Supra note 47 and accompanying
accompanying text.
57. Supra
Supra note 50 and accompanying
accompanying text.
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)
203(a)(1) (2006)
(2006) (granting author right to terminate
terminate grant).
59. See id.
id. § 203(a)(2)
203(a)(2) (granting author's
author's heirs right to terminate
terminate grant).
60. See id.
id. § 203(a) (delineating termination rights that come into existence upon
nonexclusive grant of a transfer
nonexclusive
transfer or license
license of a copyright).
id. § 203(a)(3)
61. See id.
203(a)(3) ("Termination
("Termination of the grant may be effected
effected at any time during a
period of five years beginning
thirty-five years from the date of execution
of the
beginning at the end of
ofthirty-five
execution ofthe
grant.").
62. See id.
id. § 203(a)(4)
203(a)(4) ("The
(liThe termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in
writing...
[Tihe notice shall be served
writing
... upon the grantee
grantee.....
. .. [T]he
served not less than two or more than
effective date oftermination].").
of termination].").
ten years before [the effective
63. See Bourne Co. v. MPL Commc'ns
1987)
Comrnc'ns Inc., 675 F. Supp. 859,
859, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
("When
("When a termination is effected, all rights covered by the terminated
terminated grant revert, on the
of termination, to the author or his statutory
successor."); modified,
modified, 678 F. Supp.
effective date oftermination,
statutory successor.");
70 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
1988); see also supra
accompanying text.
supra notes 30-32 and accompanying
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)
203(a)(2) (2006) ("Where
("Where an author
author is dead, his or her termination
interest
interest is owned, and may be exercised [by his or her statutory successors, as defined in
§ 203(a)(2)(A)
203(a)(2)(A) through § 203(a)(2)(D)].").
203(a)(2)(D)]."). Hypothetical 1 and the related examples are
distinguishable from Stewart v. Abend in several ways. Stewart v. Abend,
distinguishable
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 221
(1990)
the author
author dies
dies before the renewal
the renewal
(1990) ("[I]f
("[I]fthe
renewal period, then the assignee [of
[ofthe
renewal rights]
may continue
the author's successor
continue to use the original work only if
ifthe
successor transfers the renewal
renewal rights
to the assignee.").
prevent
assignee."). In Stewart,
Stewart, the Court ruled that a successor copyright holder could prevent
production
derivative works, where
production of
ofderivative
where right to produce
produce derivative works arose under agreement
with original copyright holder who died before renewal
Id. Apart from the facts that the
renewal term. [d.
Stewart case arose under the Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35. Stat. 1075,
1075, and
and
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To be more concrete, when Author transfers a copyright to Person
B on
Person Bon
February 1,
1, 2009, there are three property
February
property interests to track for gift tax
65 (2) the termination rights
B;65
purposes: (1) the copyright transferred to Person
PersonB;
6
6
(3) the termination rights that arise
that arise in Author himself;
himse1f;66 and (3)
(contingently)
in
Author's
spouse
and children. 67 It is clear that Author
(contingently)
transfers the copyright by gift to Person
Person B. It is less clear whether
whether Author
Author
transfers
transfers(or if,
if, instead, copyright
copyrightlaw creates)
creates)the termination rights to (or in)
transfers
Author and his heirs. Without a transfer by Author, there cannot be a gift68 The next subsection evaluates whether, for gift tax
taxable transaction. 68
of the termination rights, and ifso,
if so, how
purposes, there is a transfer
transfer by Author ofthe
the transfer should be treated for gift tax purposes.
Gift
2. No Transfer,
Transfer,No Gift
2.
Absent statutory rules on what constitutes
constitutes a transfer
transfer for gift tax purposes,
we look to case law for the meaning
gift
meaning of the term. Generally
Generally speaking, for gift
tax purposes, one cannot make a "transfer" to oneself.69 Therefore,
if the
Therefore, even ifthe
author, not federal copyright law, is the source
source of the termination
termination right, the
author cannot
cannot transfer
transfer that right to himself for gift tax purposes. No gift tax
will be
on the creation
"retention") of the author's termination
imposed
creation (or "retention")
70
right.70
right.
Consider
Consider next whether the author transfers
transfers termination
termination rights to his heirs.
Case law suggests that no gift-taxable transfer occurs without a sufficient

involved
of termination rights in the property
involved renewal rights, not termination rights, the holders oftermination
transferred in Hypothetical
holder-not
Hypothetical 1 are in a position analogous to the successor
successor copyright holder--not
the licensee-in
licensee-in Stewart.
Stewart. Id.
Id. at 212. The rights of Author or Author's
Author's heirs to terminate
terminate the
PersonB's rights in the property, just as the
prior transfer in Hypothetical
Hypothetical I are superior to Person
successor
Stewart.
successor copyright
copyright holder's
holder's rights were
were superior to the licensee's in Stewart.
65. Supra
Supra note 47 and accompanying
accompanying text.
203(a)(1) (granting termination right to Author);
Author); see also
also infra
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(I)
Part III.B.2.
IILB.2.
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)
also
203(a)(2) (granting
(granting termination
termination rights to Author's heirs); see also
infra Part III.B.2
infra
IlI.B.2 (discussing
(discussing the transfer of termination rights to an author's heir).
I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1)
(2006) (imposing a gift tax on any "transfer of property
68. See LR.C.
2501(a)(I) (2006)
property by
gift"). A transfer is a condition precedent
precedent to the imposition of a gift tax. Id.
Id.
25.2511-1(e) (as amended
69. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-I(e)
amended in 1997); Comm'r v. Hogle, 165 F.2d
F.2d
352, 353 (lOth
(10th Cir. 1947)
1947) ("[T]he
("[T]he tax cannot be sustained
sustained unless there was a transferor,
transferor, a
transferee, and an effective
effective transfer
transfer......").
").
70. But see infra
of I.R.C.
infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (discussing application
application ofLR.C.
§ 2702).
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72 the
Estate of DiMarco
degree of voluntariness.771' In Estate
DiMarco v. Commissioner,
Commissioner,72
decedent worked for a company that provided a benefit plan to all regular
decedent
73 The
74 The
employees. 73
decedent's spouse thus was entitled to a death benefit. 74
United States Tax Court found that the decedent had not made a taxable
transfer to his spouse of the value of the death benefit simply by going to
75 The court noted several factors: "the decedent's participation in
work. 75
several
decedent's participation the
pension plan inaugurated
inaugurated by his employer
employer was not voluntary," the decedent
decedent had
beneficiaries, and, except by resigning from his
no role in selecting
selecting the beneficiaries,
employment,
employment, the decedent could not defeat the beneficiaries'
beneficiaries' rights to the death
76
76
benefit. The court
"[W]e do not believe
court explained:
explained: "[W]e
believe that a taxable event can
occur
occur for gift tax purposes unless there is first and in fact an act of transfer
transfer by
transfer unless the act is voluntary ...
...that
the donor; and there can be no act of
oftransfer
7
is, he must intend to do SO.,,77
SO."
In other words, accepting employment
employment is not a
creation
"transfer" for gift tax purposes, absent any action directed
directed toward the creation
survivorship benefit.7878
of the survivorship
Applying DiMarco
DiMarco to the creation of the heirs'
heirs' termination
termination rights in
Hypothetical
1, the voluntariness required for the imposition of a gift tax
Hypothetical 1,
appears to be present. When Author in Hypothetical
Hypothetical 1 makes a gift of the
copyright to Person
Person B, Author takes specific and directed action with respect to
the property
property in which the heirs'
heirs' termination
termination rights arise. Unlike the decedent
decedent in
DiMarco,
DiMarco, however, Author in Hypothetical
Hypothetical 1 undertakes a "voluntary" action
for the sole purpose of making a donative
donative transfer. Author intentionally
intentionally

See, e.g.,
of DiMarco v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 653,663
(1986) ("[T]here
can be
no
71. See,
e.g., Estate ofDiMarco
653, 663 (1986)
("[T]herecan
beno
transfer unless the act is voluntary and the transferor
act of
oftransfer
transferor has some awareness
awareness that he is in fact
making a transfer of property, that is, he must intend to do so.").
id.
72. See id.
(holding that decedent
decedent did not make a taxable
taxable gift of the survivor's income
of the survivor's income benefit
benefit to his spouse, and the present value ofthe
benefit is not, therefore, an
an
adjusted taxable gift).
Id. at 655. Under the benefit
73. [d.
benefit plan, if an employee
employee died, an amount equal to three
compensation became
times the employee's
employee's annual compensation
became payable to his or her surviving spouse and
dependents. Id.
[d. The individual employee
employee had no power
power to change the benefit, designate
beneficiaries or terminate
Id.The
different beneficiaries
terminate the benefit
benefit (except by resigning from employment). [d.
Id.at 657-58.
657-58. The court, however, concluded that because
Service sought to impose a gift tax. Id.
sufficiently voluntary, it could
could not be subject
subject to gift
the transfer to the surviving spouse was not sufficiently
Id. at 663.
tax. Id.
id. at 655 (explaining
(explaining survivors benefit
74. See id.
benefit plan).
("Respondent argues, however, that decedent's
of going
75. See id.
id. at 622-63 ("Respondent
decedent's simple act ofgoing
January 9, 1950, constituted an act of transfer
transfer by decedent for gift tax
to work for IBM on January
disagree.").
purposes. We disagree.").
Id.at 662.
76. [d.
Id. at 663.
77. [d.
Id.at 662-63 (summarizing court's position that decedent's
decedent's working at IBM did not
78. [d.
not
constitute an act of transfer for gift tax purposes).
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disposes of property
property that
that otherwise
otherwise would
would be includible
includible in
in his gross estate
estate at
at
disposes
79 For gift
79
death,
thereby
creating
rights
in
his
heirs.
tax
to
function
as
in
heirs.
For gift
to
aa
death,
creating
meaningful
"back-stop"
estate tax,
tax, a donative transfer ofa
of a copyright should
meaningful "back-stop" for estate
be precisely the type
of
voluntary
that
to
gift of the
of
voluntary
action
that
gives
rise
to
aa taxable gift
be
80
rights.so
termination rights.
Admittedly, in both
both DiMarco
DiMarco and Hypothetical
Hypothetical I,
1, the
the decedent lacks the
Admittedly,
ability to designate the recipients of the termination rights. S81! But Author in
Hypothetical I1 is fully aware that he is making a donative transfer (to
(to Person
Person
Hypothetical
Author's actions are
are sufficiently voluntary and connected to the creation of
of
B). Author's
the termination
termination rights
rights so
so that
that a court likely would fmd
find that Author's
Author'screation of
of
the
the termination rights is a transfer for
for gift tax purposes to the holders of the
82
contingent
rights.
contingent termination rights.S2
If so, the next question is what value the
transfers have for gift tax purposes.
3. Valuing
Valuing Sticky Copyrights
Copyrights
3.
in
In order to determine the value of any taxable gift by Author in
Hypothetical I,
1, we must determine not only the value ofthe
of the interest transferred
Hypothetical
to Person
PersonB but also the value of the termination right (whether retained by
to
Author or transferred to his heirs). Under I.R.C. §§ 2702, for purposes of
of
valuing a donative transfer
transfer in trust to or for a member of the transferor's
transferor's
83
family,
of the
family,S3
an interest in trust retained by the transferor or certain members
members ofthe
79. Supra
Supra Part
Part II.
80.
See
Estate
Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39,44
of gift
80. See Estate of
ofSanford
39, 44 (1939)
(1939) (describing purpose
purpose ofgift
tax as
"to prevent
tax
as lito
prevent or compensate
compensate for avoidance
avoidance of death taxes"). Again,
Again, this assumes
assumes that the
author
author is treated
treated as having made a transfer of the termination
termination rights. Supra
Supra notes
notes 71-73 and
and
accompanying
accompanying text.
81. See
DiMarco v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 653,
655 (1986)
(1986) (describing
decedent's
81.
See Estate
Estate of
of DiMarco
653,655
(describing decedent's
inability
terminate the Group
inability to
to alter,
alter, amend,
amend, revoke,
revoke, or
or terminate
Group Life
Life Insurance
Insurance and Survivors
Survivors Income
Income
Benefit Plan).
82.
the gift
the characterization
the expiration
82. For
For aa discussion
discussion of
ofthe
gift tax
tax consequences
consequences of
ofthe
characterization of
ofthe
expiration
of
the termination
III.B.4. Note that
the author is alive
ofthe
termination right as a taxable
taxable lapse,
lapse, see
see infra Part 1II.B.4.
that if
ifthe
at
at the
the time
time the
the termination
termination window opens,
opens, the
the author
author may
may defeat
defeat the heirs'
heirs' termination
termination rights by
revesting
revesting the
the property
property in
in himself.
himself. In
In aa conventional
conventional analysis,
analysis, this
this power
power should
should partially
partially defeat
defeat
the
the gift.
gift. See Treas.
Treas. Reg. 25.2511-2
25.2511-2 (as
(as amended
amended in
in 1999)
1999) (indicating
(indicating that the
the donor's
donor's power
power to
revoke
revoke or
or extinguish
extinguish the
the gift
gift negates
negates it); see also Smith
Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318
318 U.S. 176,
176, 181
181
(1943)
(1943) ("The
(liThe essence
essence of
of aa gift
gift by
by trust
trust is the
the abandonment
abandonment of
of control
control over
over the
the property
property put
put in
in
trust.").
trust."). This
This analysis,
analysis, however,
however, must
must be
be subject
subject to
to two
two qualifications.
qualifications. First, because
because the
the giver's
giver's
ability
ability to
to defeat
defeat the termination
termination right
right is
is contingent
contingent upon
upon surviving
surviving until
until the
the window
window opens,
opens, the
the
value
value of
of the
the giver's
giver's retained
retained right
right must
must reflect
reflect this contingency.
contingency. Second,
Second, I.R.C.
l.R.C. § 2702
2702
(discussed
(discussed in
in Part
Part II.B.3,
II.B.3, infra),
infra), somewhat
somewhat supplants
supplants the
the conventional
conventional analysis,
analysis, permitting
permitting the
retention
retention of
of such
such aa contingent
contingent right
right to be disregarded
disregarded in determining
determining the
the value of the
the gift.
gift.
83.
I.R.C. §§ 2702,
ofl.R.C.
2702, aa transfer
transfer resulting
resulting in
in one
one or
or more
more term
term interests
interests is
is
83. For
For purposes
purposes of
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interest.",,844 A
transferor's family is valued at zero, unless it is a "qualified interest.
qualified interest is the right to receive fixed payments, at least annually; the
percentage of the fair market value of property held in
right to receive a fixed percentage
certain
trust, payable at least annually; or a noncontingent
noncontingent remainder
remainder interest in certain
85
A copyright termination
trusts.85
termination right does not meet the definition of a
trustS.
ofAuthor
of I.R.C. § 2702,86 and so the rights of
"qualified
Author
"qualified interest" for purposes ofI.R.C.
87
should have zero value for gift tax purposes. Thus, the interest transferred to
PersonB, as well 88
Person
as the value of any retained or transferred termination right,
be taxable.
would be
taxable. 88
if any, might be
The next section considers
considers what exclusions or deductions,
deductions, ifany,
termination
available
available in connection
connection with a gift of a copyright or a copyright termination
interest.
interest.

treated
treated as a transfer in trust. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-4(a) (1992)
(1992) ("For purposes
purposes of section
interest in property with
with respect
respect to which there are one or more term
2702, a transfer
transfer of an interest
successive (as
interests is treated as a transfer in trust. A term interest
interest is one of a series of successive
contrasted with concurrent)
concurrent) interests.").
of any retained
2702(a)(2)(A) (2006) ("The value ofany
84. See I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2)(A)
retained interest which is not a
qualified interest shall be treated as being zero."). A "qualified
"qualified interest" means:
the right to receive fixed amounts payable
(1) any interest which consists of
ofthe
payable not less
frequently
frequently than annually,
(2)
amounts which
which are payable
payable
(2) any interest which
which consists of the right to receive amounts
of the fair market value
not less frequently than annually and are a fixed percentage
percentage ofthe
of the property in the trust (determined
(determined annually),
annually), and
and
(3) any noncontingent remainder
remainder interest if all of the other
other interests in the trust
trust
paragraph (1) or (2).
consist of interests
interests described in paragraph
Id.§ 2702(b).
!d.
85. See id.
id. § 2702(b)
2702(b) (defining a "qualified interest").
ofwhich must be met before interest
id.(giving three separate criteria, at least
86. See id.
least one ofwhich
also supra
can be considered "qualified"); see also
supra note 85 and accompanying
accompanying text (same). We
transferof
of
this Article that the author
authoris deemed to make a transfer
assume throughout the remainder of
ofthis
the termination
termination rights that arise in his heirs. If this were not the case, the analysis would differ.
I.R.C. § 2702, the author
author would not be deemed to have made
87. Prior to the enactment of
ofI.R.C.
(reflecting
the retained
a gift of
ofthe
retained interest. See Smith v. Shaughnessy,
Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 181 (1943)
(1943)(reflecting
of a retained reversion).
the government's
government's concession
make a gift
gift ofa
concession that the taxpayer did not make
any copyright
itself takes into account
88. Presumably, the value of
ofany
copyright itselftakes
account the likelihood that the
termination
termination rights will be exercised at some point in the future, among other
other factors. See
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INTANGffiLE
INTANGIBLE
GORDON V.
SmrIH &
&RUSSELL L. PARR,
GoRDON
V. SMITH
PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND
of copyrights to an individual owner
ASSETS 300-01
300--0 I (2d ed. 1994)
1994) (explaining that the value ofcopyrights
owner is
one assumes
solely represented by the present value of future royalty income). Beyond
Beyond that, if
ifone
of the termination
made a taxable transfer
transfer ofthe
termination rights, and that Author's interest has
that Author has made
of $20,000-must
zero value for gift tax purposes, then all of the value-the fair market value of$20,00o-must
be allocated
allocated between
between the interest transferred
transferred to Person
Person B and the interests
interests that arise in the giving
giving
between the
author's spouse and heirs. It is not clear how that value should be allocated between
copyright transferee and the holders of the termination rights.

HeinOnline -- 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 40 2010

STICKY COPYRIGHTS
COPYRIGHTS
STICKY

41

4. Qualifying
Qualifying Sticky Copyrights
Copyrights for Beneficial Tax Treatment
a.
a. The Annual Exclusion
With any gift, one looks to see whether
whether the transfer
transfer might qualify for the
annual exclusion.
exclusion. Under I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1),
2503(b)(1), gifts (other than gifts of future
interests
of taxable gifts.
gifts. s899 To
interests in property) are not included in the total amount oftaxable
the extent that the value of the copyright
copyright is less than the annual exclusion
amount, some portion of the value
value of the transfer
transfer to Person
Person B will escape
escape
90
heirs' termination
taxation. 9o
But the heirs'
termination rights, exercisable
exercisable no sooner than thirtyfive years
copyright, 9' are future interests
years after the transfer of the copyright,91
interests that will not
92
qualify
qualify for the annual exclusion.

MaritalDeduction
b. The Marital
Deduction
As a technical matter, it is possible that a lifetime gift of a copyright
copyright to a
93
93
spouse might not qualify
for
the
marital
deduction.
The
regulations
explicitly
qualify
regulations explicitly
provide that copyrights are terminable interests. 94 They further deny the marital
deduction
transferor retains an interest in the
deduction for a terminable interest when the transferor
transferred
of the property after the
transferred property and may "possess or enjoy any part ofthe
termination
transferred to the donee spouse.,,95
spouse." 95
termination or failure of the interest
interest therein transferred
To the extent that a copyright transferor
transferor is deemed to "retain" the termination
termination
right, even
law,96 no marital deduction
even though the right arises by operation
operation of
oflaw,96
would appear to be available. As a matter of policy, such a result would be
problematic. In effect, copyright holders would be unable to make tax-free
transfers
transfers to their spouse of their intellectual
intellectual property. Contrast this with the
the
ability of owners of virtually every other type of property
property to make tax-free
lifetime
lifetime gifts. There is no justification
justification for such inequity.
89. LR.C.
I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1).
2503(b)(1).
90. See id.
id (explaining that gifts up to the annual
exclusion amount are not counted as
annual exclusion
taxable gifts); see also supra
supra note 49 and accompanying
accompanying text (same).
91. See 17 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)
(2006) (setting timetable for exercise
oftermination rights);
203(a)(3)(2006)(setting
exercise oftermination
see also
also supra
accompanying text (same).
supra note 26 and accompanying
92. See I.R.C.
2503(b)(1)) (excluding
LR.C. § 2503(b)(1
(excluding future interests in property from qualifying as taxalso supra
accompanying text (discussing
exempt gifts); see also
supra notes 80-88 and accompanying
(discussing the creation and
valuation
heirs' contingent termination of rights).
valuation of heirs'
93. LR.C.
I.R.C. § 2523(b)
2523(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-1(c)
(1994).
25.2523(b)-I(c) (1994).
94. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-l(a)(3).
25.2523(b)-I(a)(3).
95. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-1(c)(1).
25.2523(b)-I(c)(1).
96. lnfra
1.
infra Part
Part W.B.
IV.B.I.
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When an author makes a gratuitous
gratuitous transfer
transfer of an interest in copyright,
consider the possibility that the termination
termination rights arising in the author's spouse
97
Generally
marital deduction.97
Generally
have value and that they qualify for the gift tax marital
speaking, gifts to a spouse who is a United
States
citizen
will
qualify
for the
United
I.R.C. § 2523 unless the transferred property
property is a
marital deduction under LR.C.
interest. 98 A terminable
nondeductible terminable
terminable interest,98
terminable interest
interest is one which "will
terminate
of time or on the occurrence
of
occurrence or failure to occur
occur of
terminate or fail on the lapse oftime
99 Examples of terminable interests
some contingency."
include
life
estates,
contingency. ,,99
interests
00
copyrights.1IOO
terms of years, patents,
patents, and copyrights.
Like a term of years, a copyright
copyright
01
of time. wl
interest lasts for a fixed period oftime.
But not all terminable interests are
nondeductible terminable
nondeductible. 102
102 For gift tax purposes, nondeductible
terminable interests
arise:

(1) if
donor retains
retains in
himself, or
or transfers
transfers or
or has transferred
transferred (for less
less
(1)
if the
the donor
in himself,
than adequate
adequate and
and full
full consideration
consideration in money or money's
than
money's worth) to any
person other than such donee spouse (or the estate of such spouse), an
interest in
in such
such property, and ifby
if by reason
reason of such retention
retention or transfer
transfer the
the
donor (or his heirs or assigns) or such person (or his heirs or assigns) may
of such property
property after such termination
termination or failure
possess or enjoy any part ofsuch
of the interest transferred
transferred to the donee spouse; or
(2) if the
the donor
donor immediately
transfer to the donee
donee spouse has a
(2)
immediately after the transfer
power to appoint an interest in such property
property which he can exercise (either
alone or in conjunction with any person) in such manner that the appointee
may possess
possess or enjoy
enjoy any party
party of
of such
such property
after 0such
termination
of
may
property after
termination of
3
spouse.1103
donee spouse.
the donee
to the
transferred to
failure of
of the
the interest
interest transferred

id.§ 2523(a) (establishing the gift tax marital deduction).
97. See id.
98. See id.
id. § 2523 (allowing
(allowing for the marital deduction
deduction except
except where the gift is a life estate
terminable interest and other enumerated
enumerated conditions apply).
or a terminable
I(a)(3) (1994); see also I.RC.
I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1)
("Where, on the
99. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)25.2523(b)-I(a)(3)(1994);seeall'o
2056(b)(I)("Where,
contingency, or on the failure of an event or
lapse of time, on the occurrence
occurrence of an event or contingency,
or
contingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no
contingency
deduction shall be allowed.").
allowed.").
100. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-I(a)(3)
25.2523(b)-l(a)(3) (1994)
(1994) ("Life
("Life estates, terms for years, annuities,
annuities,
patents, and copyrights
copyrights are therefore terminable interests.").
interests.").
101.
of works made for hire, copyrights in works created after January
101. Except in the case ofworks
January 1,
1978, last for the life of the author plus seventy years. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006)
(2006)
("Copyright in a work created
1, 1978,
1978, subsists from its creation
("Copyright
created on or after January
January 1,
creation and,
endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70
70
[subject to certain exceptions],
exceptions], endures
years after the author's death.").
102. See I.R.C. § 2523(b) (2006) (giving
(giving conditions whereby
whereby a transfer of a terminable
terminable
nondeductible).
interest is nondeductible).
103. Id.
Id.
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To take the classic
classic example,
example, assume
assume that a transferor
transferor creates
creates aa lifetime income
the transferee-spouse,
interest
interest in her transferee-spouse.
transferee-spouse. Upon the death
death of
ofthe
transferee-spouse, the
remainder
transferor.'01044 In this
remainder in the property
property passes to the children
children of the transferor.
example, the transferee-spouse's
transferee-spouse's life estate is a terminable
terminable interest because
because it
0 5 It does not qualify for
will terminate
the transferee-spouse. 105
terminate upon the death of
ofthe
the marital deduction
deduction (i.e.,
(Le., it is nondeductible)
nondeductible) because
because the remainder
remainder will pass
06
to the
consideration.'106
If,
the transferor's children
children without consideration.
If, however, the
transferor's
children
obtained
the
remainder
interest
by
purchasing
transferor's children obtained
remainder interest purchasing it from the
transferor-instead of by gift from the transferor-then
transferor-then the spouse's
spouse's income
transferor-instead
interest
interest would qualify
qualify for the marital
marital deduction, even
even though it is a terminable
terminable
interest.
107
interest.107
spouse's
In the case of lifetime transfers
transfers of a copyright, a surviving
surviving spouse's
termination
termination rights become vested only if (1) the author does not exercise the
termination
termination right before her death; (2)
(2) the spouse survives the author; and
open.108
still open.
the window
exercises the termination
termination right
right while
while the
window is
is still
lOS
(3) the spouse exercises
one of these conditions is not met, then the termination
If any
anyone
termination right in the
of the gift by
byAuthor
author's spouse evaporates.
evaporates. In Hypothetical
Hypothetical 1, at the time ofthe
Author
to Person
Person B,
E, the interest of Author's spouse (the termination right) would
if, for example, Author
appear to be a terminable interest. It will cease
cease to exist if,
exercises
his
termination
right,
or
if
the
spouse
predeceases
exercises
termination
predeceases Author,
Author, or if the
09
other heirs refuse to join
join with the spouse in exercising
exercising the right. 109
104. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
AL., PROPERTY
PROPERTY 226 (6th ed. 2006) (explaining that aa
life
life estate
estate with no remainder reverts back to the grantor or, if the grantor predeceases
predeceases the life
tenant, to the grantor's heirs through the grantor's will).
(1994))("Life
("Life estates,
estates, terms for years, annuities,
105. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(b)-1(a)(3)
25.2523(b)-1 (a)(3)(1994
patents, and copyrights are therefore terminable
terminable interests." (emphasis added)).
106. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1)
2056(b)(1) ("Where, on the lapse of
time, on the occurrence of
an event
oftime,
ofan
of an event or contingency
contingency to occur, an interest passing to the
or contingency, or on the failure ofan
surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed.").
107. It has been suggested
suggested that, in permitting a deduction for the value ofthe
of the life estate in
107.
example like this, the Internal Revenue Code inadvertently
inadvertently creates gaming opportunities for
an example
& Deborah V. Dunn, RPM Trusts:
Trusts: Turning
Turning the Table
Table on
taxpayers. See David A. Handler &
Chapter14, TR.
TR. &
& EST., July 2000, at 31,
31, 39 ("In
("In an RPM
RPM Trust, the grantor
grantor will not hold an
an
Chapter
interest in the property both before and after the transfer, and thus Sec. 2702(a) would not
apply.").
203(b)(2) (2006) ("The future
future rights that will revert upon termination
108. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(2)(2006)("The
of the grant become vested on the date the notice of termination has been served.
served ....
. .. The
the author, authors, and other persons named in, and in the proportionate
proportionate shares
rights vest in the
provided [by the statute].").
109. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1)
2056(b)(1) (2006) ("Where, on the lapse oftime,
of time, on the occurrenceofan
occurrence of an
109.
contingency, or
or on the failure ofan
of an event or contingency
contingency to occur, an interest passing to
event or contingency,
the surviving
surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed.
allowed.");
also Rev. Rut
Rul.
"); see also
1982-2 C.B. 215 (indicating that,
that, where the spouse
82-184, 1982-2
spouse must
must make an election
election in
in order to
to
82-184,
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Furthennore, in Hypothetical
Hypothetical 1, Author receives
receives no consideration
consideration for the
Furthermore,
transfer, and so the marital
marital deduction
deduction would
would not be
be allowed.110
allowed. 110 For
For that
that reason,
transfer,
the termination
ofthe
tennination rights to Author's spouse should
should not qualify
qualify for
for
transfer of
the transfer
the gift tax marital
marital deduction."'
deduction. III
Note that the Internal
Internal Revenue
Revenue Service
Service (the Service)
Service) has
has embraced
embraced a casecaseNote
exception to the terminable
terminable interest
interest rule where the transferee spouse is
law exception
given an elective right to take
take the donor's (or decedent's)
decedent's) property."
property.lI22 The
Service
Service permits
pennits a deduction
deduction even
even though
though the property would pass to a third
party without
without consideration
consideration if the spouse allowed a lapse to occur. I1"'13 While
this exception
available in the copyright context, the
exception probably
probably would not be available
contours
contours of the authorities
authorities are illuminating.
illuminating.
l1 4 the United States Tax Court
Estate of Mackie
Commissioner,114
In Estate
Mackie v. Commissioner,
whether a bequest to a surviving spouse at the
addressed the question of whether
addressed

spouse-nonterminable--in
receive
receive the interest, it must be unconditionally
unconditionally exercisable
exercisable by
by the spouse--nonterminable--in
order to qualify
qualify for the marital
marital deduction).
110. See I.R.C. § 2523(b)(1)
110.
2523(b)(I) (stating that a nondeductible interest arises when the author
author
andfull consideration
transferredfor less than adequate
"retains in himself, or transfers or has transferredfor
adequate andfu/l
consideration
other than such donee
donee spouse" (emphasis
(emphasis added)).
added)).
in money or money's worth to any person other
111.
Ill. Cases decided
decided under the estate tax rules suggest that where a spouse's interest is
is
is
subject to a condition precedent
precedent other than an election
election by the spouse, no marital deduction is
authority on point, however, the estate tax law supplies
allowed. Absent
Absent any direct gift tax authority
See, e.g.,
materia. See,
guidance because courts must interpret estate and gift tax laws in pari materia.
supplementary to the estate tax.
[T]he gift tax was supplementary
(1945) ("'
v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311 (1945)
Merrill v.
('''[T)he
together."'
The two are in pari material [sic] and must be construed together.
'" (quoting Estate of Sanford
Sanford
(1945) (noting
Comm'r v. Weymyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945)
39, 44 (1939)));
(1939))); Comm'rv.
v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39,44
"Congress directed [the estate and gift tax laws] to the same purpose, and they should not
that "Congress
1983)
671, 676 (2d Cir. 1983)
application"); cf Natchez
be separated
separated in application");
Natchez v. United States, 705 F. 2d 671,676
Court's
(applying a gift tax rule to an estate
estate tax question in part because of "the Supreme Court's
consistent rulings that the estate tax and gift tax are to be construed
construed in pari materia"
materia" (citations
(citations
omitted)). On conditions precedent,
precedent, see Rev. Rul. 82-184,
82-184, 1982-2 C.B. 215 ("A cash bequest
bequest in
lieu of a life estate, payable
payable unconditionally at the election
election of a surviving
surviving spouse within a
reasonable time after the decedent's death qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction under
reasonable
2056 of the Code.").
section 2056
Neugass into the
and Neugass
1982-2 C.B. 215 (incorporating
112. See Rev. Rul. 82-184, 1982-2
112.
(incorporating Mackie and
of these cases
terminableinterest). Both ofthese
of a terminable
allow a deduction despite the existence ofa
decision to allow
infra.
are discussed at length infra.
883, 884 (4th Cir.
Cir. 1976) (allowing the
113. See Estate of Mackie v. Comm'r, 545 F.2d 883,
the terms
deduction despite the fact that "a person other than the surviving spouse could, under the
nine, come into the possession or
if Mrs. Mackie
Mackie did not elect to take under item nine,
of the bequest, ifMrs.
ofthe
consideration).
enjoyment of the property" without consideration).
(1975) (declining to accept the
v. Comm'r,
Comm'r, 64 T.C. 308, 310 (1975)
114. See Estate of Mackie v.
refusal to accept,
accept,
[Petitioner's] failure or refusal
Commissioner's argument that "the possibility of [Petitioner's]
Commissioner's
to the
the
bequest was
was not
not entitled
entitled to
coupled with the gift over in such an eventuality," meant the bequest
Cir. 1976).
aft'd, 545 F.2d 883 (4th Cir.
deduction), affd,
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spouse's election
election qualified
qualified for the
the marital
marital deduction."
deduction. liS5 In
In Mackie,
Mackie, the
spouse's
decedent bequeathed
bequeathed certain
certain property
property to his wife
wife and gave
gave her
her the right
right to select
select
decedent
estate other property,
property, so that the total
total value
value of the
the property
property she
she
from the estate
1 6 The
received equaled
estate tax
tax marital
marital deduction. 116
The only restraint on
on
equaled the full estate
received
Mackie's interest was that her election
election must
must occur
occur within four months of
of
Mrs. Mackie's
1 17
to make
decedent's date
date ofdeath.
make the election, she
she
of death.'117 If Mrs. Mackie failed
the decedent's
8
the bequest."
would be deemed to have rejected
rejected the
bequest. 118
would
The
The Service
Service asserted
asserted a deficiency
deficiency against
against the estate
estate on the grounds
grounds that the
119
9
The
deduction."
the
marital
qualify
not
bequest
Mackie
did
not
for
marital
deduction.
Mackie
to
Mrs.
bequest
in
acquired a "vested
taxpayer argued
argued that
that Mrs. Mackie
Mackie acquired
"vested indefeasible
indefeasible interest" in
taxpayer
bequest as ofthe
her husband's death, and that the election was
of the moment of her
the bequest
a mere
mere formality for "perfection"
"perfection" ofthat
120 In finding for the taxpayer,
of that interest. 120
Mackie's interest was not subject
subject to a condition
condition
the court reasoned that Mrs. Mackie's
2
court
'
The
deduction.
for
the
marital
precedent, and as such, it qualified
121
precedent,
explained that Mrs. Mackie was in the same position as a surviving
surviving spouse who
22
is disinherited and
and subsequently
subsequently elects against the will.1
Will. 122
If amounts passing
passing
against a will qualified
pursuant to an election
election against
qualified for the marital deduction,
deduction,
court
amounts passing
passing pursuant
pursuant to an election under a will should, too, the court
123
23
of election, was
reasoned. Because Mrs. Mackie's
Mackie's right, like a statutory right ofelection,
Commissioner's characterization
of petitioner despite the Commissioner's
id. (ruling in favor ofpetitioner
characterization of
of
115. See id.
"non-deductible").
terminable and "non-deductible").
the will as a "conditional bequest" that was terminable
instruction that the wife should have "properties
116. See id.
id. at 309 (describing the will's instruction
the said maximum deduction or
her..,
to be selected by her
... equal in total value to the remainder
remainder of
ofthe
exemption so computed").
exemption
"election she shall make by a statement
id. (repeating
117. See id.
(repeating the will's provision that the "election
date
in writing to that effect delivered to [the testator's] executrix within four months from the date
of [the testator's] death").
death").
[testator's] said wife to deliver such statement to
118. See id.
id. (quoting that "failure of [testator's]
11K
[testator's] executrix
executrix within such time shall be deemed an election by her to reject this devise,
bequest
bequest and appointment in full").
id. at 310 (repeating the Commissioner's argument
119. See id.
argument that "the possibility of
[petitioner's] failure or refusal to accept, coupled with the gift over in such an eventuality,"
meant the bequest was not entitled to the deduction).
120. Id.
Id.
id. at 313 (distinguishing bequests held nondeductible
121. See id.
nondeductible "because conditioned on
addition to merely accepting the bequest" that "had
the beneficiary's performance
performance of acts in addition
the power
of
independent legal significance and constituted substantive limitations both on the
power of
transferred").
acceptance and on the interest transferred").
surviving
disinherited surviving
id at 312 ("Mrs. Mackie was put in the same position as aa disinherited
122. See id.
election ....
spouse who is given a statutory right of election.
. .. [Here] her right of election is
than by statute, but we perceive this to be a difference without aa
encompassed by the will rather than
encompassed
distinction." (citations omitted)).
and
election and
without aa distinction" between statutory election
the "difference without
id. (noting the
123. See id.
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to her was eligible for the marital
unqualified,24 the property passing to
deduction. 124
25
Commissionerl25
v. Commissioner
Neugass v.
of Neugass
Estate of
in Estate
decedent in
Like Mackie,
Mackie, the decedent
26 In
bequeathed
election.'126
bequeathed property
property to his surviving spouse at the survivor's election.
127
1
27
Neugass, the decedent owned a substantial art collection.
In his will, he
Neugass,
bequeathed
bequeathed to his wife a life estate in the artwork and gave her the right,
exercisable within six months ofhis
of his death, to "elect to take absolute ownership
exercisable
of any item, whereupon said item shall become the absolute property of my
128
wife."'
Upon the death of the wife, a life estate in the art would pass to the
wife." 128
decedent's daughter, if living, or if not, to a named charity.129
charity. 29 Mrs. Neugass
decedent's
did in fact elect to take absolute ownership of certain of the artwork, and the
executors
of the estate claimed a marital deduction under LR.C.
I.R.C. § 2056(b)
executors ofthe
2056(b) for
30
130
the value of the artwork passing outright
to
Mrs.
Neugass
The taxpayer
taxpayer
outright
Neugass.
appealed
the. Tax Court's disallowance
appealed from the.
disallowance of the estate tax marital
deduction. 131
deduction.131
In finding for the taxpayer, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reasoned
reasoned that Mrs. Neugass received an alternative bequest
bequest (i.e.,
(i.e.,
132
either a life estate or outright ownership).
Service's
ownership).132
The court rejected the Service's

right of election conferred
conferred in a will).
124. See id.
specified
id. at 314 ("Mrs.
("MrS. Mackie was given the absolute right to take outright a specified
portion
of decedent's
estate...
decedent's estate
... the property
property which she received
received passed
passed to her within the
portion of
meaning
section 2056(a) and (e)
(e) and did not constitute a terminable
meaning of
of section
terminable interest within the
meaning
section 2056(b).").
2056(b).").
meaning of section
1977) (deciding that
125. See Estate of Neugass v. Comm'r, 555 F.2d 322, 328 (2d Cir. 1977)
"[t]he statutory
statutory policy
the 'elective
'elective share'
share' cases is applicable
ofthe
applicable to the
"[t]he
policy governing the disposition of
testamentary
situation as
presented here"
and ordering
testamentary election
election situation
as presented
here" and
ordering judgment
judgment for the taxpayer).
126. See
327 ("The
will..,
life
126.
See id.
id. at
at 327
(liThe decedent's will
... gave
gave Mrs. Neugass the choice between
between a life
use
the 'collection'
'collection' .. . or
or the
the vested
vested indefeasible
of absolute ownership
ownership of
any or all
ofthe
indefeasible interests
interests ofabsolute
ofany
use of
of the items she selected .... ").
).
127. See id.
at 323
127.
id. at
323 (recognizing
(recognizing the claimed value of the part of the art collection
collection chosen
by spouse as $383,495.00).
$383,495.00).
128. Id. at 323 n.2.
n.2.
129. See
129.
See id.
id. at
at 323
323 n.1
n.l (quoting the
the will as
as directing "life
"life use
use of
of said collection"
collection" to the
the
daughter
death of
of the
the wife and to the charity should the
the daughter
daughter not survive
survive the wife).
wife).
daughter upon
upon death
130. See
("Ludwig Neugass'
executors claimed
130.
See id.
id. at
at 323
323 ("Ludwig
Neugass' executors
claimed a marital deduction
deduction in the amount
amount
of
$682,605.12 including
of $682,605.12
including $383,495.00
$383,495.00 for the value of the works of art of which decedent's
decedent's
widow
to take absolute
widow elected
elected to
absolute ownership.").
ownership.").
131. See id.
id. at 325 ("[A]ppellants
("[A]ppellants seek
seek a determination
determination by this court
court that the interest
interest
131.
acquired
acquired by
by Mrs.
Mrs. Neugass
Neugass pursuant
pursuant to Article FIFTH was an alternative
alternative or elective bequest
bequest and,
as such
such was a non-terminable
non-terminable interest
interest which qualified
qualified for the marital
marital deduction.").
deduction.").
132. See
("[W]e are
the opinion
132.
See id.
id. at
at 327
327 ("[W]e
are of
ofthe
opinion that Mrs. Neugass
Neugass had, under the provisions
provisions
of
of the decedent's
decedent's will,
will, a mere
mere election
election between
between alternatives.").
alternatives.").
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133
controlling legal principles."
plea to disregard
disregard Mackie as "contrary to controlling
principles." 133
Instead, the court likened the Neugass case to Mackie, explaining that Mrs.
Neugass, like Mrs. Mackie, faced a choice, and alternate bequests, on their
134 The
face, did not preclude eligibility
eligibility for the estate tax marital deduction. 134
court drew on evidence
evidence that the testator intended to provide his wife with
35 that
"maximum flexibility,"'
he intended
the bequest
bequest to qualify for "as full a
"maximum
flexibility,"135 that
he
intended the
136
allowed,"' and that Mrs. Neugass
Neugass became
marital deduction as the law allowed,,,136
37
from the
of property
property from
the decedent's
decedent's estate.
estate. 1137
entitled to absolute ownership
ownership of
138 In doing so, the Service
The Service has embraced these cases. 138
transferee spouse must be given an absolute right to take
emphasizes that the transferee
reasonable
the property, and that the election
election must in fact be made within a reasonable
139
1,
time after the transfer giving rise to the right of election. 139
In Hypothetical
Hypothetical 1,
the spouse's
termination
rights
cannot
be
exercised
for
a
period
of
years
and
so
spouse's termination
cannot
ofyears
any election
election is deferred until the window opens. Moreover, the transfereespouse's termination
termination rights are contingent
contingent upon survivorship
survivorship of Author and
140
Author's nonexercise of
the right. 140
Thus the Neugass-Mackie
Neugass-Mackieexception
ofthe
exception to the
terminable interest rule likely
likely would not apply to copyright
copyright termination rights.

id.
("Commissioner...
133. See id.
("Commissioner ... contends that Mackie and this case are contrary to our
'controlling federal legal principles.'
opinion in [Allen], and the 'controlling
OpInIOn
principles.' Allen, however, is
distinguishable from both.").
134. See id.
("The indication
id. at 326 (liThe
indication is then clear that Article FIFTH
FIFTH did not contain,
explicitly or impliedly, a power of appointment, but instead an alternative bequest.").
bequest.").
135. Id.
[d.
136. Id.
[d.
137. Id.
[d. at 327.
138. See Rev. Rul. 8282-184,1982-2
Mackie and
and Neugass
Neugass as support for the
I 84, 1982-2 C.B. 215 (using Mackie
adoption of this exception to the terminable
terminable interest rule).
id.
of a life estate, payable unconditionally
unconditionallyat the election
election
139. See id.
("A cash bequest in lieu ofa
reasonable time after the decedent's death qualifies for the
of the surviving spouse
spouse within aa reasonable
Code."II (emphasis
estate tax marital deduction
deduction under section 2056 of the Code.
(emphasis added)).
140. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(
2056(b)(1)
("[O1n the lapse oftime,
of time, on the occurrence
of an event
1) (2006)
(2006) ("[O]n
occurrence ofan
contingency to occur, an interest passing
or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency
passing to the
fail....
."). Because the transferee-spouse's
transferee-spouse's termination
termination
surviving spouse will terminate
terminate or fail
....").
rights depend upon (a) Author having a right of survivorship from the transfer
transfer to Person
Person B and
himself, the transferee-spouse
transferee-spouse cannot
(b) Author failing to exercise
exercise the termination right for himself,
cannot be
III.B.1 (describing the general rules
said to have a "nonterminable" interest. See supra
supra Part Ill.B.l
applicable to gifts).
applicable
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c. Consequences
Consequences ofFailing
of Failingto Qualify
Qualifyfor
Available
c.
for the Available
Deductions
Exclusions and
andDeductions
Exclusions
termination interests likely will not qualify for the
Because copyright tennination
deduction,14' any deemed transfer of
of
annual exclusion or the gift tax marital deduction,141
142
142
termination
rights
by
the
author
will
be
fully
taxable.
So
in
Hypothetical
tennination
I,I,
when Author makes a lifetime gift ofa
of a copyright to Person
PersonB, assuming that he
of the tennination
termination rights,143
rights, 43 he makes a taxable gift of
is the deemed transferor ofthe
of
144
PersonB,I44
B, and that transfer is eligible for the annual
the interest transferred to Person
exclusion. 145
145 In contrast, any gift of the tennination
termination right-a future interestinterest46
will
not
qualify
for
the
will
annual exclusion.1
exclusion. 146 The failure to qualify the
termination rights for the annual exclusion is another example ofhow
of how copyright
copyright
tennination
141. How might a giving or selling author overcome
overcome the problem that a spouse's copyright
141.
termination interest is terminable? Consider this hypothetical:
Hypothetical 1.5. Author is married and has two adult children.
children. Author already
Hypothetical
1,2009,
applied his maximum unified credit to prior lifetime transfers. On January 1,2009,
$13,000 annual exclusion cash gift to their
each of Author and his wife made a $13,000
DaughterA. Taxpayer is the creator and owner ofa
of a copyright having a
child, Adult Daughter
of $20,000. Author wants to make a gift ofthe
of the copyrightto
copyright to Adult
fair market value of$20,000.
DaughterA,
A, but he is concerned
concerned that the termination rights that arise in the spouse
Daughter
(Adult Daughter
Daughter A's mother) would not qualify for the marital deduction. Author
sells the copyright to Adult Daughter
Daughter AA for $20,000 minus x. Adult Daughter
Daughter A
pays her mother x for the mother's
mother's copyright termination
termination interest that will arise on
account of the sale.
Assume (however
unrealistically for discussion purposes) that $20,000 represents
and
Assume
(however unrealistically
represents adequate and
full consideration
consideration for all interests in the copyright. Although a sale
sale ordinarily
ordinarily might take a
transaction outside the scope
the nondeductible
nondeductible terminable
ofthe
terminable interest rule, federal copyright law
law
transaction
scope of
prevents the
the mother
mother from divesting
prevents
divesting herself from her copyright termination rights. 17 U.S.C.
§ 203(a)(1)-(2)
203(a)(1 )-{2) (2006). Thus, the same problem would
would arise ifAuthor
ifAuthor sold the
the copyright
copyright to his
spouse, and the spouse paid
termination interest.
Daughter A for the daughter's
daughter's termination
spouse,
paid Adult Daughter
142. See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (setting
certain
142.
(setting the value of the taxable
taxable estate after
after deducting certain
property passing
property
passing to the surviving spouse). The statute
statute provides:
shall ... be determined by deducting from the
[T]he value of the taxable estate shall...
value
of the
the gross
gross estate
estate an
an amount
amount equal
equal to the value
value of any interest
interest in property
property
value of
which passes
passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving
surviving spouse,
spouse, but
but only to
to
the
extent that
the gross
the extent
that such
such interest
interest is
is included
included in
in determining
determining the
the value
value of
ofthe
gross estate.
Id. Because
ld.
Because no deductions
deductions apply to the transfer of termination
termination rights, they will be taxable in
in
full. Id.
Id.
143.
Supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
143. Supra
and accompanying
144.
144. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1
25.2512-1 (as amended
amended 1992)
1992) ("[I]f a gift is made in property, its
value
the date
the gift shall be
the gift. The value
the property
ofthe
be considered
considered the amount
amount of
ofthe
value of
ofthe
property
value at
at the
date of
is
price at which
is the
the price
which such
such property
property would
would change
change hands between
between a willing
willing buyer
buyer and a willing
willing
seller ...
.
....").
145.
145. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
146.
146. Supra
Supra Part
Part III.B.4.a.
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owners are treated
treated more harshly for tax purposes than are other property
Furthermore, given
owners. The law should not support this discrimination. Furthennore,
how difficult it is to allocate value between
between the copyright
copyright transferee
transferee and the
47 administration
termination rights,
transfer
rights,147
administration of a gift tax on the transfer
holders of the tennination
of termination rights would be extremely complex. The next section considers
oftermination
the possibility that a disclaimer could be used to avoid these difficulties.

5.Planning
Copyrights
5.
Planning with Sticky Copyrights
Because
Because of the unique nature of copyrights, many standard tax planning
techniques will be unavailable. Consider, for example,
example, the use of disclaimers.
148
Used
Disclaimers are a standard feature of any post-mortem
post-mortem tax plan. 148
correctly, disclaimers
disclaimers can prevent a gift from occurring
occurring in order to avoid an
49 Generally
adverse tax result.
result.1149
disclaimer causes property to pass
Generally speaking, a disclaimer
150
the disclaimant had predeceased
But disclaimers
ifthe
predeceased the transferor. lso
disclaimers have no
as if
5
application
rights.'151' By law, termination rights are not
application to termination rights.
52 and
53
alienable,
of
alienable,ls2
therefore statutory heirs may not disclaim them. 153
A gift of
accompanying text.
147. Supra
Supra note 88 and accompanying
(1988);
148. See generally
generally Mitchell M. Gans, Disclaimers,
Disclaimers, 46 INST. ON FED. TAx'N
TAX'N § 52.01 (1988);
Steve R.
R. Akers, Postmortem
PlanningConsiderations:
of Income, Gift,
Gift, and
and Estate
Estate
Postmortem Planning
Considerations: A Review ofIncome,
Tax Planning
Planning Issues,
Issues, SNO
SNO ALI-ABA
ALI-ABA 1211 (2007) (explaining the many uses of disclaimers
disclaimers in
postmortem planning).
DuKEMWnIER ET AL.,
AL., supra
("The most common
common motivations
motivations for
149. See DUKEMINIER
supra note 36, at 132 (liThe
creditors."); see also Jewett
v. Comm'r,
property from creditors.");
Jewett v.
disclaimer are to reduce
reduce taxes or to keep property
455 U.S. 305,
("[T]he practical effect
305, 310 (1982)
(1982) ("[T]he
effect of petitioner's
petitioner's disclaimers was to reduce
reduce the
his taxable
expected
ofhis
taxable estate and to confer
confer a gratuitous
gratuitous benefit upon the natural objects of
of
expected size of
his bounty.").
bounty. ").
("[A]lmost all states have enacted
150. See DtuKEMINIER
DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
AL., supra
supra note 36, at 133 ("[A]lmost
disclaimant is treated as having
having predeceased
predeceased the
disclaimer legislation that provides
provides that the disclaimant
decedent.");
2-1106(b)(3)(B) (2006) ("lfthe
("If the disclaimant
disclaimant is an
decedent."); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1106(b)(3)(B)
individual,
subparagraphs (C) and (D), the disclaimed
disclaimed interest
interest
individual, except as otherwise provided in subparagraphs
distribution. ").
passes as if the disclaimant had died immediately before the time of distribution.").
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)-(2)
151.
203(a)(I )-{2) (2006)
(2006) (naming
(naming all the procedures
procedures for postmortem
allowing for disclaimers).
transfer of termination rights without allowing
id.
notwithstanding any
any
152. See id.
§ 203(a)(5)
203(a)(5) ("Termination
("Termination of the grant may be effected
effected notwithstanding
agreement
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.").
But see Allison M. Scott, Oh Bother:
Bother: Milne, Steibeck, and an Emerging
Emerging Circuit
Circuit Split over the
Alienability of Copyright
Copyright Termination
Termination Rights, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357,368
357, 368 (2007) ("The
(liThe
interpretation of the termination provisions of the Copyright
Copyright Act and their
their
Ninth Circuit's interpretation
interaction
interaction with state contract
contract law has created
created tension between
between Ninth Circuit courts and Second
Circuit courts with respect
alienability or inalienability
inalienability of termination
respect to the question of the alienability
rights.").
153. See I.R.C. § 2518
2518 (2006) (defining
(defining a disclaimer as a method by which a transferee
transferee
rejects an interest given by a transferor, thus disqualifying
disqualifying the inalienable
inalienable termination interest
interest
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copyright termination
termination interest,
interest, then,
then, isis aa gift
gift that
that one
one must
must accept.
accept. Thus
Thus a
copyright
of termination
termination rights
rights may not be
be defeated
defeated by disclaimer. In
In
taxable gift
gift of
taxable
as Part
Part IV
N discusses,
discusses, the value
value of
of the termination
termination right may
may be
be
addition, as
54
included in the
the giving
giving author's
author's gross
gross estate
estate at the
the giving
giving author's
author's later
later death.'
death. 154
included
This is to be
be contrasted
contrasted with the inter
inter vivos
vivos gift
gift of
of an
an ordinary
ordinary (i.e.,
(Le.,
noncopyright) asset, where
where the donor
donor can
can prevent
prevent post-gift
post-gift appreciation
appreciation from
from
noncopyright)
being included
included in
in the
the gross estate. In this sense, copyrights
copyrights are particularly
particularly
being
sticky from aa transfer-tax
transfer-tax perspective.
sticky

C. The Selling Author and the Derivative
Derivative Gift Syndrome
C.
Moving
Moving away
away from a scenario in which an author makes a wholly
wholly donative
transfer of a copyright, consider
consider next an author who
who sells
sells to a third party a
Somewhat counterintuitively,
copyright or
or an interest
interest in a copyright. Somewhat
counterintuitively, such a
copyright
partially sticky
sticky for gift tax purposes.
purposes. The author makes a taxable
taxable gift of
of
sale is partially
the heirs'
heirs' termination
termination rights. To illustrate, consider
consider this variation
variation on
1:
Hypothetical
Hypothetical I:
Hypothetical
Hypothetical 2. Author is the creator
creator and owner
owner of a copyright having a
1, 2009, in an arm's-length
fair market value of $20,000. On February
February 1,
transaction with a third party (Buyer), Author sells the copyright
copyright in return
transaction
for a payment of$19,000
of $19,000 cash. The price is discounted to account for the
termination rights, which are worth $1,000.
$1,000.

Hypothetical 2 involves three separate
separate property interests: the copyright itself,
itself,
55 As
heirs' termination
termination rights.1155
in the case
termination rights, and the heirs'
Author's termination
Hypothetical 1,
of the wholly donative transfer in Hypothetical
I, when Author sells the
copyright to Buyer on February 1,2009,
1, 2009, Author may be deemed to retain15a7
heirs. 157
his heirs.
to his
right to
termination right
transfer aa termination
and transfer
himself' 56 and
termination right for himself'56
Those rights allow Author or his heirs to terminate the prior transfer to
15S
58
Buyer.
If Author dies before the exercise period without terminating the sale,
Buyer.1
directly from
causes the disclaimed property to pass directly
from the category). A qualified disclaimer
disclaimer causes
Id. §§ 25
2518(a).
the disclaimant. Id.
not the
18(a).
the initial transferor, not
interests).
treatment of copyright interests).
infra Part IV (analyzing estate tax treatment
154.
154. See infra
heirs).
and their
their heirs).
authors and
(discussing termination rights of authors
supraPart IIII(discussing
155. See supra
155.
of
transfer of
the transfer
to terminate
terminate the
right to
author's right
an author's
(establishing an
17 U.S.C.
U.S.C. §§ 203 (2006) (establishing
156. See 17
156.
interest).
aa copyright interest).
law creates aa termination
copyright law
III.B. 1 (explaining that federal copyright
Part III.B.I
supraPart
157.
157. See supra
of the
the copyright).
copyright).
transfer of
the author's
author's transfer
heirs upon the
his heirs
author and his
right in the author
right
owned,
termination isis owned,
or her
her termination
dead, his
his or
an author
author isis dead,
203(a)(2) ("Where an
U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2)("Where
See 17
17 U.S.C.
158. See
February I,1,
on February
beginning on
exercised beginning
They may be exercised
."). They
follows....
as follows
exercised, as
be exercised,
and may be
and
....").
the
before the
(ten years
years before
2034 (ten
after February
February I,1, 2034
time after
At any
any time
2049. At
February 1,1, 2049.
2044, until
until February
2044,
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and his widow and adult children survive him, then Author's surviving spouse
and children own-and
own-and may exercise--the
exercise-the termination
termination rights."
rights. 1599
We tum
turn now to the question of whether an author makes a gift-taxable
gift-taxable
transfer of the termination right when the author sells a copyright to a third
party. Recall that in DiMarco,
DiMarco, the court
court held that a gift requires an element of
of
160
voluntariness. 160 In that case, employment
employment alone was an insufficient basis for
finding that the decedent had made a gift of a survivor's benefit under an
employee
employee pension plan.'16
plan. 161 In Hypothetical
Hypothetical 2, Author sells a copyright
copyright to a third
$1,000. Arguably
party, giving rise to termination interests,
interests, presumably
presumably worth $1,000.
the facts ofHypothetical
of Hypothetical 2
2 are distinguishable
distinguishable from the wholly donative transfer
transfer
1, insofar as Author receives payment
in Hypothetical
Hypothetical I,
payment for the copyright. Author
either
or own
of his
either will consume the amount realized from Buyer
own it at the time ofhis
estate).1 62
in Author's
Author's gross
gross estate).162
death (causing inclusion in
In Hypothetical
Hypothetical I,
1, it seems fairly clear that Author engages in voluntary
transfer
transfer of wealth
wealth to Person
Person B sufficient to make the termination
termination rights
conferred
conferred on the heirs subject to the gift tax. The transfer in Hypothetical
Hypothetical 2 is
entirely
entirely different. In Hypothetical
Hypothetical 2, Author does not set out to make a gift. To
the contrary, Author sells the asset for its value and only indirectly confers
Author's primary
rights on his or her heirs. Author's
primary motivation appears to be the
economic benefit from the copyright, not a gift to his heirs. In this sense,
Hypothetical
DiMarco(although it is not clear). Ifthis
If this analysis is
is
Hypothetical 2 is closer to DiMarco
correct and Hypothetical
Hypothetical 2 is analogous to DiMarco,
then
no
gift
should
be
DiMarco,
63 Table A summarizes
connection with the sale to Buyer.1
deemed to occur
occur in connection
Buyer. 163
summarizes
commencement
commencement of the exercise period), but no later than February 1, 2042 (two years prior to
the expiration of the exercise period), Person
Person B must receive
receive written notice of the intent to
exercise the termination
("[T]ermination shall be effected
termination right. See id.
id. § 203(a)(4)
203(a)(4) ("[T]ermination
effected by serving
").
an advance notice
notice in writing ....
....").
id.
the termination right upon author's
author's
159. See id.
§ 203(a)(2)
203(a)(2) (listing all the possible
possible heirs of
ofthe
death).
160. See Estate ofDiMarco
of DiMarco v. Comm'r,
T.C. 653,663 (1986)
eomm'r, 87 T.e.
(1986) (noting that a taxable
taxable gift
"an act oftransfer
of transfer by the donor; and there can be no act oftransfer
oftransfer
can only occur
occur when there is Itan
unless the act is voluntary
voluntary and the transferor
transferor has some awareness that he is in fact making a
transfer of property").
propertylt).
161. See id.
id.
"the simple
161.
(rejecting the idea that Itthe
simple act of going to work for an employer
employer that
has an automatic, non-elective, company-wide
. . constitutes
company-wide survivors
survivors income
income benefit plan.
plan ...
constitutes a
'transfer'
'transfer' of an interest in the benefit
benefit for either estate or gift tax purposes").
purposesIt).
I.R.C. § 2031(a) (2006) (ItThe
("The value of the gross estate of the decedent
162. See I.R.e.
decedent shall be
determined by including
including..,
of his death of all property,
... the value
value at the time ofhis
property, real or personal,
personal,
situated."). If Author consumes
tangible or intangible,
intangible, wherever situated.It).
consumes the full amount realized by the
copyright to Buyer prior to death, it will not be included
sale of the copyright
included in this time-of-death
time-of-death
valuation.
DiMarco,87 T.C.
163. See DiMarco,
T.e. at 663 (holding that no gift took place).
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the tax consequences
consequences of the lifetime transfers of copyrights discussed in this
Part.
Consequences of Copyright Transfers
Table A: Gift Tax Consequences
Will gift tax be imposed on...
Will gift tax be imposed on ...
value of copvri~t
copyright transferred?
·.....value
transferred?
...
value
of
termination
interest
in
· ..value
interest created in
author?
value of termination interest created
·.....value
created in
author's spouse?
value of termination interest
·.....value
interest created in
author's
author's heirs (other than spouse)?
spouse)?

Type of Author
Type
Author
Hoarder Giver Seller
Hoarder
n/a
Yes
No
n/a

No

No

n/a

Yes

Maybe

n/a

Yes

Maybe
Maybe

consequences of transfers
The next Part considers the estate tax consequences
transfers of copyrights.
IV.
Taxation ofCopyright
of CopyrightInterests
IV. Estate
Estate Taxation
Interests
64
Copyrights are freely transferable
transferable by will.
Although heirs may have the
will.1164
the decedent's
certain conditions
right to terminate
terminate any of
ofthe
decedent's lifetime transfers, if
ifcertain
are met,16
met,1655 they have no ability to terminate
terminate any testamentary
testamentary transfers made by
166
an author. 166
When an author dies, the value of all copyrights or interests in
copyrights owned by the author will be included
included in her gross estate for federal
167
Generally, copyrights
estate tax purposes. 167
copyrights have an estate tax value equal to

164. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006) (excluding transfer
the
transfer by will from the provisions
provisions of
ofthe
statute).
165. Supra
Supra note 108 and accompanying text.
166. Supra
Supra Part III.B.5.
III.B.5.
167. See I.R.C. § 2033 ("The
the gross estate
of all property
(liThe value of
ofthe
estate shall include the value ofall
to the extent
decedent at the time of his death."); see also
also Treas.
extent of the interest therein
therein of the decedent
Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b)(as
(b) (as amended
of every item includible
includible in a decedent's
decedent's
amended in 1965) ("The
(liThe value ofevery
gross estate ...
... is its fair market value at the time ofdecedent's
of decedent's death, except...
ifthe executor
executor
except ... ifthe
elects the alternate valuation method ....").
.... ."). Fair market value is lithe
"the price at which property
property
would
change hands
hands between
between a willing buyer and a willing
would change
willing seller, neither
neither being under any
any
compulsion
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." Id.
Id.
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable
The
The valuation necessarily
necessarily will take into account the time-limited
time-limited nature of the copyright;
between
between otherwise
otherwise identical
identical time-limited rights and rights unlimited in duration, the timelimited rights will be less valuable. See Newark
Newark Morning
Morning Ledger
Ledger Co. v. United
United States, 507 U.S.
546,
556 (1993)
(1993) ("Intangible
("Intangible assets such as patents
546,556
patents and copyrights are depreciable over their
'legal lives,'
lives,' which are specified by statute."). Therefore, the wealth
'legal
wealth transfer
transfer tax value of a
copyright
copyright should reflect its limited duration.
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their fair
fair market value
value as of the
the decedent's date of death or
or as
as of the
the alternate
alternate
their
1168
68
valuation
date,
if
the
executor
so
elects.
Part considers
considers what amount, if
valuation date, ifthe executor elects. This Part
any, will
will be included
included in the estate
estate of a hoarding author, a giving author, and aa
any,
selling author. The
The estate tax consequences
consequences are different
different in
in each
each case and
and may
selling
depend
on
the
time
of
the
author's
death
in
relation
to
the
termination
ofthe author's
period.
depend
A. The
The Hoarding
HoardingAuthor and
andthe
the Estate
Estate Tax Marital
MaritalDeduction
Deduction
A.
In the case of an author
author who dies without
without having made any lifetime
In
transfers of copyrights, tax-free treatment of an author's sizeable
sizeable estate will
depend largely on the
the qualification of property in the estate for the marital
169 In order to qualify for the estate tax marital deduction, a property
deduction. 169
transfer must
must satisfy four requirements, which are somewhat similar to the gift
transfer
170
deduction requirements:
tax marital deduction
requirements: 170

168. See Treas. Reg. § 20.203l-l(b)
20.2031-1(b) (as amended
1965) (explaining the fair market
market
amended in 1965)
value/alternate valuation
valuation method scheme). The alternate
value/alternate
alternate valuation date is six months after the
decedent's date of death. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-l(a)
20.2032-1(a) (as amended
2005) (noting that
amended in 2005)
decedent's
alternatively valuated property is valued
alternatively
valued either at the date it is sold "within six months" or at its
fair market value
valuation of
of
value "six
"six months" after decedent's death). For an example of the valuation
copyright in an estate,
Andrews v. United
copyright
estate, see Estate of
ofAndrews
United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279, 1295
1295 (E.D.
Va.
1994). In
that case,
the district
district court approved the estate valuation
of an author's copyrights
Va. 1994).
In that
case, the
valuation ofan
as the amount
other
expected to produce, discounted
discounted for marketing
marketing and other
amount of revenue they were expected
expenses, as
as well
well as the possibility that the copyrights would not be exploited. Id
Id. at 1287.
1287. For
For
expenses,
discussion of the challenges
challenges of
valuing copyrights
ofvaluing
copyrights for estate
estate tax purposes, see Bartow, supra
supra
aa discussion
note
Professor Bartow
unexploited
note 9,
9, at
at 401.
401. Professor
Bartow explains:
explains: "The long term
term value of
ofaa previously
previouslyunexploited
copyrighted
Id. Previously
Previously exploited works are more
copyrighted work is
is exceptionally
exceptionally difficult
difficult to predict." Id
susceptible
susceptible to
to valuation,
valuation, but challenges
challenges remain:
A
an exclusive
exclusive license
license may
may generate
generate easily
easily
A copyright
copyright that
that is
is the
the subject
subject of an
calculable
during the
the license, but the
ofthe
the license may expire
expire or can
calculable royalties
royalties during
the term
term of
be terminated
copyright term, posing
posing valuation
valuation
terminated well before the end of the copyright
complexities
complexities for the
the unlicensed
unlicensed interval. Copyrights
Copyrights that
that are
are nonexclusively
nonexclusively
licensed
some clues
licensed provide
provide some
clues to
to their
their pecuniary
pecuniary merit
merit based on past royaltygenerating
generating performances,
performances, but
but valuing them
them is still
still fraught
fraught with
with uncertainties
uncertainties
because
of the likelihood
likelihood of changing
changing societal
societal tastes and
and desires
desires throughout
throughout the
the
because of
lengthy
a typical
ofa
typical copyright.
copyright. A
A copyrighted
copyrighted song, for example,
example, may
may sell
sell
lengthy duration
duration of
many
many records,
records, fade to obscurity,
obscurity, and
and then re-emerge
re-emerge more popular
popular than ever
ever
decades
for.
decades later
later on
on aa trajectory
trajectory impossible
impossible to
to accurately
accurately predict
predict or
or easily
easily plan
plan for.
Id.
Id.
169.
EquitableApportionment,
169. See
See Jeffirey
Jeffrey N.
N. Pennell,
Pennell, Tax
Tax Payment
Payment Provisions
Provisions and
andEquitable
Apportionment, SH092
SH092
ALI-ABA
or unlimited marital
marital deduction,
deduction, any
any normal
normal
ALI-ABA 593,
593, 613
613 (2003)
(2003) ("With
("With an
an 'optimum'
'optimum' or
estate
tax imposed
imposed on
on the
the estate
estate would
would be
be generated
generated by
by property
property that
that did
did not
not qualify
qualify for the
the
estate tax
deduction.").
deduction. If).
170.
170. Supra
Supra Part
Part III.B.4.b.
III.BA.b.
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property must be included in the gross estate of the
((1)
I) The property
decedent.
decedent.
(2) The property
property must "pass" from the decedent.
(2)

(3) The property must pass to the decedent's
decedent's surviving spouse.
(4) The property interest must not be a non-deductible
non-deductible terminable
interest.
interest.]771
on
Generally speaking, a terminable interest is one "which will terminate or fail on
the lapse of time or on the occurrence
occurrence or the failure to occur
of
some
occur
172
terminable interests
Examples of
ofterminable
interests include life estates and terms
contingency." 172
73
74
of years. 173
years, a
ofyears.
Copyrights, too, are terminable
terminable interests. 174
Like a term of
ofyears,
75
copyright interest lasts for a fixed period of time. 175 But not all terminable
interests are nondeductible. 176
176 Nondeductible
Nondeductible terminable interests are those in
which:
(i) Another interest in the same property passed from the decedent
decedent to some
other person for less than adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth, and

171.
Internal Revenue
Revenue Code
Code explains the
the restrictions
follows:
171. The Internal
restrictions as follows:
shall..,
... be determined by deducting from the
[T]he value of the taxable estate shall
value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in property
property
decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to
which passes or has passed
passed from the decedent
the gross estate.
the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of
ofthe
I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2006); see
see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-1
20.2056(a)-i (1958)
(1958) ("A deduction is
allowed..
decedent for the value ofany
of any property interest
allowed .... from the gross estate
estate of
ofdecedent
interest which passes
from the decedent to the decedent's surviving spouse ifthe
if the interest is a deductible
......
deductible interest ...."
(emphasis
(emphasis added)).
172. Treas. Reg.
Reg. § 20.2056(b)-I(b)
20.2056(b)-l(b) (as amended
amended in 1994);
1994); see also I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(l)
2056(b)(1)
172.
("Where,
time, on the occurrence
an event or contingency,
contingency, or on the failure of
("Where, on the lapse of
oftime,
occurrence of
ofan
of
contingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving spouse
an event or contingency
spouse will terminate
terminate or
fail, no deduction
deduction shall
shall be
be allowed."); supra
supranotes 99-102
99-102 (discussing
(discussing terminable
terminable interests).
fail,
173. See
20.2056(b)-l(b) (as amended in
in 1994)
1994) ("Life
("Life estates,
terms for
173.
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-I(b)
estates, terms
years, annuities, patents, and
and copyrights
copyrights are therefore terminable interests.").
years,
174. Id.
Id.
175. See 17 U.S.C.
U.S.C. §§ 302 (2006) (explaining that except
of works made
except in cases ofworks
made for hire,
anonymous works,
works, and
and pseudonymous
pseudonymous works,
works, copyrights
inworks
works created
created after
after January
1, 1978,
1978,
anonymous
copyrights in
January 1,
last for
for the
the life
life of the author plus
plus seventy
seventy years).
176. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-I(a)(as
20.2056(b)-i (a) (as amended in
("Tlhe fact that an interest in
in 1994)
1994)("[T]he
property passing to
to aa decedent's surviving spouse is
is aa 'terminable
'terminable interest'
makes itit
property
interest' makes
nondeductible only
only...
under the
the circumstances
circumstances described
in paragraph
paragraph (c) of
of this section,
nondeductible
... under
described in
and..,
and ... if it does not come within one of the exceptions
exceptions referred to in paragraph (d)
(d) of this
section.").
section.").

HeinOnline -- 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 54 2010

STICKY COPYRIGHTS
COPYRIGHTS
STICKY

55

of its passing, the other person or
or his
his heirs or
or assigns may
may
(ii) By reason of
possess or enjoy any Dart
part ofthe
of the property after the termination
termination or failure of
177
' s IOterest.
.
interest.
spouse's
tthe
hespouse

Evaluating these criteria, the value of a copyright interest is included in a
178
If a hoarding author bequeaths a copyright to
hoarding author's gross estate. 178
Ifa
179
her surviving spouse, then the interest will pass from the decedent 179
and no
person other than the surviving spouse may possess or enjoy any part of the
bequest-after the termination of the spouse's
spouse's
copyright-by reason of the bequest-after
80
interest.1180
interest.
A bequest of a copyright to a surviving spouse, therefore, should
qualify for the marital deduction.
think that an author's lifetime gift of a copyright is subject to
One might think:
18
' and estate
gift181
gift tax, but not estate tax. But copyrights are "sticky" for both gift
182
tax purposes. 182 The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) provides no specific
rule for the estate taxation of copyright termination rights. The next section
section
considers statutory grounds for an argument by the Service
Service that some value
associated with a copyright could be included
included in a deceased author's gross
estate. We consider three different
different scenarios: the author's death before,
during, and after the termination window.
B. The Giving
Giving Author Stuck on Copyrights
Copyrights
An author who
who gives an interest in a copyright simultaneously
simultaneously acquires a
termination
right
that
is
exercisable
a
specified
during
termination
exercisable
specified time-period after
after the
83
183
transfer.1
Recall
Hypothetical
1,
in
which
Author
gives
Person
Hypothetical I,
Person B a copyright
transfer.
177.
177.

Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-I(c)
20.2056(b)-1(c) (as
(as amended in 1994).
Treas.
1994).
(2006) ("The
("The value
the gross estate shall include the value ofall
of all
See I.R.C.
I.R.C. §§ 2033
2033 (2006)
value of
ofthe
property
the extent
of the
the interest
the decedent
at the
the time of his death.").
property to
to the
extent of
interest therein of
ofthe
decedent at
death.").
value of
taxable estate
estate shall..,
determined by
179. See id.
id. §§ 2056(a)
2056(a) ("[T]he
("[T]he value
of the
the taxable
shall ... be determined
by
deducting from
the value
value of
the gross
gross estate
estate an amount
amount equal
equal to the value of any interest in
deducting
from the
of the
property
which passes
decedent to
surviving spouse
....); Treas.
property which
passes or
or has
has passed
passed from
from the
the decedent
to his
his surviving
spouse ....");
Reg.
(as amended
in 1994)
1994) ("A
Reg. §
§ 20.2056(a)-I
20.2056(a)-1 (as
amended in
("A deduction
deduction is
is allowed
allowed under
under section
section 2056
2056 from
from
gross estate
the
value of
the gross
estate of
of aa decedent
decedent for
for the
the value
of any
any property
property interest
interest which
which passes
passes from the
decedent
to the
spouse ifthe
if the interest
deductible interest as defined
decedent to
the decedent's
decedent's surviving
surviving spouse
interest is a deductible
defined in
§ 20.2056(a)-2.").
20.2056(a)-2.").
180. See
See I.R.C.
("In the
passing from the
I.R.C. §
§ 2056(a)(5)
2056(a)(5) ("In
the case
case of
of an
an interest
interest in property
property passing
decedent..,
of the
interest so
so passing
for purposes
of paragraph
decedent ... no
no part
part of
the interest
passing shall, for
purposes of
paragraph (1)(A),
(l )(A), be
considered
surviving spouse.").
considered as
as passing
passing to any person
person other than the surviving
181. See
See supra
lII.B (discussing
(discussing the
conclusion that
181.
supra Part
Part III.B
the relevant
relevant provisions
provisions that
that yield
yield the
the conclusion
that
an author's lifetime
of a copyright
copyright is subject to a gift tax).
lifetime gift ofa
167-68 and
(discussing the implications
estate
182. See supra
supra notes
notes 167--68
and accompanying
accompanying text (discussing
implications of
ofestate
tax statutes
statutes on copyrights).
183.
the grant
183. See
See 17
17 U.S.C.
U.S.C. §
§ 203(a)(3)
203(a)(3) (2006)
(2006) ("Termination
("Termination of
ofthe
grant maybe
may be effected...
effected ... at
at the
the
178.
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on February
1, 2009. In
In that case, Author may exercise his termination rights
February 1,2009.
184
1, 2044, until February
1, 2049.'84
beginning on February 1,2044,
February 1,2049.
Author must do so
so
of the intent
by delivering a written notice ofthe
intent to exercise
exercise the termination right any
1, 2034 (ten years before the commencement
the exercise
exercise
commencement of
ofthe
time after February 1,2034
period), but no later than February
1,2047
(two
years
prior
to
the
expiration
of
February 1, 2047
expiration of
85
1 This Part considers the estate tax consequences
consequences of the
the exercise
exercise period). 185
giving author's
author's death at three different points in time: before February
February 1,2044;
1, 2044, and February
1, 2049 (assuming all notice
between February
February 1,
February 1,
requirements are met); and after February 1, 2049.
requirements
1. If
If the Giving Author Dies Before Termination
Termination Window Opens
Opens
1.
If the giving author dies before the termination period, a portion of the
copyright's
2036
copyright's value may be included
included in his gross estate under I.R.C. §
§ 2036
186
and/or
§ 2037.
2037.186
There
There should be no estate tax inclusion under I.R.C.
and/or I.R.C. §
187
§§ 2033, 2038, or 2041.
204 1.187
§§
To begin the analysis, consider this noncopyright
noncopyright
example:
Hypothetical3. On February 1,
1, 2009, X
Xtransfers
Yfor
Hypothetical
transfers property to Y
for a period
of thirty-five years. On February
X, ifX
ofthirty-five
February 1,2044, the property will revert to X,
ifX

is then living, or if not, to X's estate.
February 1,
1, 2044,
In Hypothetical 3, if X
X dies before February
2044, then the value of the
property, less Y's term interest, would be included
included in X's gross estate under
188
I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(1).
2036(a)(l ).188
Under that section, "except in case of a bona fide sale
of thirty-five years from the date ofpublication
of publication of
the work under the grant or at the end of
end ofthirty-five
ofthe
of
forty years from the date of execution
execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.").
earlier.").
184. [d.
Id.
185. See id.
("The notice shall state the effective date of the termination,
id. § 203(a)(4)(A) (liThe
termination,
which shall fall within the five-year period specified by clause
clause (3) of this subsection, and the
notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years before
before that date.").
186. See I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2006) (liThe
("The value ofthe
of the gross estate shall include the value of
of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer....
."); id.
id. § 2037(a) (liThe
("The value of the gross estate shall include
transfer ....");
include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time after
September
1916, made a transfer
transfer....").
September 7, 1916,
....").
187. See infra
infra Part lV.C.3
IV.C.3 (discussing
(discussing the reasons that I.R.C. § 2033 does not apply); infra
notes 214-18 and accompanying
infra notes 219-28
accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 2038); infra
219-28 and
and
accompanying
2041).
accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 2041).
188. See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(I)
2036(a)(1) ("The
(liThe value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property...
if...
enjoyment of the property can, through ownership
property ... if
... possession or enjoyment
ownership of such
interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent....
."); id
decedent ....");
id. § 2036(a)(2) (providing the
weaker
weaker claim that the gross estate shall include
include the value of all property to the extent that the
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for an adequate and full consideration
consideration in money
money or money's worth," the gross
estate includes the value of all property,

has made
any interest therein of which the
to the
the extent of any
the decedent
decedent has
made aa
not
life or
or for
for any period not
for his life
transfer...
transfer ... under which he has retained for
not
reference to his death or for any period that does not
ascertainable without reference
ascertainable
end before8 9his death the possession, enjoyment, or right to income from, the
property. 189
property.'
An author's termination interest
interest is like a reversionary interest
interest insofar as the
author can repossess the copyright by delivering the requisite notice and
90 If the author
period.'190
surviving
surviving until the termination period.
delivers the notice
during lifetime but dies before the window opened, the copyright
copyright would
during
9'
estate.'191
become
become payable
payable to the author's estate.
Thus, just as with a reversionary
donee's
of the donee's
the giving author's
interest, the value of
ofthe
author's copyright, less the value ofthe
interest in the property, likely will be included in the author's estate under
192
2036.192
I.R.C.
LR.C. §
§ 2036.
Observe that the Code does not specify whether rights that arise by
law (as opposed to the terms of a property transfer) are "retained"
operation of
oflaw
1 93
§ 2036(a)(2).
or I.R.C.
2036(a)(1) or
of I.R.C.
interests for purposes of
LR.C. §§ 2036(a)(1)
LR.C. §
2036(a)(2).193
Administrative
Administrative rulings and case
case law provide some illumination. In Revenue
an express trust term or
addressed the impact of
2004_64,194 the Service addressed
ofan
Ruling 2004-64,194
a local law that requires
requires the trust grantor to be reimbursed for any income tax

decedent has retained "the
lithe right, either alone or in conjunction
conjunction with any person, to designate the
persons
persons who shall possess
possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom").
therefrom").
189. ld.
Id. § 2036(a)(1).
2036(a)(I).
this section, the power
id. § 2038(b) ("Forpurposes
("For purposes of
190. See id.
ofthis
power to alter, amend, revoke, or
of the decedent's
terminate shall be considered to exist on the date ofthe
decedent's death..,
death ... whether
whether or not on
or before
before the date of the decedent's death notice
notice has been given or the power has been
exercised.").
exercised.").
("[I]f...
191.
id.
191. See id.
("[I]f ... notice has not been given or the power has not been exercised
exercised on or
considered to have been given, or the power
before the date of his death, such notice shall be considered
power
exercised, on the date of his death.").
death."). For that reason,
reason, survival until actual
actual delivery of written
notice has the same legal effect as survival until actual
actual termination.
termination.
2036(a)(1),
IV.B.1 primarily discusses the application
192.
192. Although
Although Part IV.B.I
application of I.R.C. § 2036(a)(l),
I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2)
2036(a)(2) should apply as well.
193. See I.R.C. § 2036 (2006) (stopping short of discussing retained
retained interests beyond
possession, the right to designate possession
possession to others, and the right to vote). Note that the
applicable to other
I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1)
meaning of retention
retention for purposes
purposes of
ofI.R.C.
2036(a)(l) is not necessarily applicable
III.B.4.
Supra Part III.BA.
estate tax sections. Supra
of a trust, who is treated as the
2004-64,2004-2
194. Rev. Rul. 2004-64,
2004-2 C.B. 7 ("When
("When the grantor
grantor ofa
owner of the trust under subpart E, pays the income
income tax attributable
attributable to the inclusion
inclusion of the
of the
trust's income in the grantor's taxable
taxable income, the grantor is not treated as making a gift ofthe
beneficiaries.").
the tax to the trust beneficiaries.").
amount of
ofthe

HeinOnline -- 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 57 2010

58

67 WASH.
WASH. &
67
LEE 1.
&LEE
L. REV.
REV. 25
25 (2010)
(2010)

95
attributable to the
the trust.
trust.'195
either case,
case, the Service ruled, the
the full value
value ofthe
of the
In either
attributable
is includable in the
the grantor's
grantor's estate
estate for
for purposes
purposes of I.R.C.
I.R.C.
trust's assets is
96
2036(a)(1).1
Service considered irrelevant the issue
§§ 2036(a)(l
).196
Thus the Service
issue of
of whether
whether
"retention"
was
accomplished
by
an
affirmative
provision
in
the
of
"retention" was accomplished by an affirmative
instrument
of
197
statute. 197
state statute.
of aa state
reason of
by reason
or by
transfer or
In contrast
contrast to the position taken
taken by the Service, there is case law that
In
that
suggests
that
rights
conferred
on
a
taxpayer
solely
by
operation
of
state
law
do
of
suggests
1
98
not satisfy the retention requirement. In Wyly v. Commissioner,
Commissioner,198 the decedent
community property to an irrevocable
irrevocable trust that paid income to his
transferred community
life, remainder to be held in further trust for the couple's
couple's
wife for life,
grandchildren. 199
199 Under applicable Texas
Texas law, the decedent
decedent had a community
community
property interest in the income from the trust. 22OO
00 The Fifth Circuit ruled that
of
rights bestowed on the decedent by state law did not constitute the retention of
of I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(I).201
2036(a)(1). 20 1 In the Fifth Circuit
a "right to income" for purposes ofI.R.C.
at least,
least, then,
then, explicit retention of a right-not a right arising by operation of
of
at
state law-is a condition precedent to estate tax inclusion under I.R.C.
2036(a)(1 ).202 But because the position taken by the Service in Revenue
§§ 2036(a)(l),z°2

195. See id.
id. ("[W]hat
("[W]hat are the gift tax consequences
consequences when the grantor pays the income tax
attributable to the inclusion
and...
if,
... if,
attributable
inclusion of the trust's income in the grantor's taxable income, and
pursuant to
to the
governing instrument or applicable local law, the grantor mayor
may or must be
the governing
pursuant
?").
reimbursed by the trust...
trust
id.("If
("If... the grantor must be reimbursed
196. See id.
reimbursed by the trust for the income
income tax payable
by the
the grantor
by
grantor that is attributable
attributable to the trust's income, the full value
value of the trust's assets is
includible
grantor's gross estate under
under § 2036(a)(1).").
2036(a)(I).").
includible in the grantor's
id. ("If...
197. See id.
("If. .. the trust's governing
governing instrument or applicable
applicable local law gives the
trustee
discretion to reimburse
income tax
trustee the discretion
reimburse the grantor
grantor for that portion of the grantor's income
liability,
the trust's assets
of that
that discretion..,
discretion ... will not
not cause
cause the value
value of
ofthe
assets to be
be
liability, the
the existence
existence of
includible
includible in
in the grantor's
grantor's gross estate.").
estate.").
198. Wyly
1282, 1294
1980) ("It
F.2d 1282,
1294 (5th Cir. 1980)
("It is our conclusion
conclusion that
198.
Wyly v. Comm'r, 610 F.2d
§§ 2036(a)(1)
2036(a)(I) does not sweep
sweep the value of these
these transfers
transfers into the
the donor's gross estate.").
1285.
199. Id.
Id. at 1285.
200.
200. See
See id.
id. ("The
(liThe crucial
crucial portions of
of that body
body of Texas
Texas law
law are those
those which
which cause
cause the
income
separate property
a spouse
both spouses.").
ofa
spouse to
to be the
the community
community property
property of
ofboth
spouses.").
income from
from the
the separate
property of
201.
1294 ("To
federal and
201. See
See id.
id. at
at 1294
(liTo summarize
summarize our review
review of
offederal
and state
state law,
law, we have
have held that
the
the donor's
donor's community
community property
property interest
interest in
in the
the income
income produced
produced by
by these
these transferred
transferred properties
properties
is
is so
so limited,
limited, contingent,
contingent, and
and expectant
expectant that
that itit does
does not amount to
to a 'right
'right to the income,'
income,' within
within
the Act....").
Act ....").
202.
law as
202. See
See id.
id. ("We
(" We do
do not believe
believe that
that an
an interest, created
created solely
solely by operation
operation of
oflaw
as the
unavoidable
of what was in form
form and
and within the intendment
intendment of
of the parties
parties the
the most
most
unavoidable result
result of
complete
v. Hinds, 180
180 F.2d
F.2d 930,
930,
complete conveyance
conveyance possible, isis aa retention
retention within
within the
the Act.");
Act."); Comm'r
Comm'rv.
932
the wife
(" [W]hether the
the income
income be
be regarded
regarded as
as separate
separate property
property of
ofthe
wife or
or as
as
932 (5th
(5th Cir.
Cir. 1950)
1950) ("[W]hether
community
'the
community income
income from
from the
the wife's
wife's separate
separate property,
property, the
the taxpayer
taxpayer retained
retained neither
neither 'the
possession
possession or
or enjoyment
enjoyment of,
of, or
or the
the right
right to the
the income
income from,'
from,' the
the property
property so
so as to make
make
applicable
l(c)(I)(B) ....
).
....").
applicable Sec.
Sec. 81
811(c)(I)(B)
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Ruling 2004-64
2004-64 points in the other direction, it is difficult to predict the tax
decedent
results with certainty.203
certainty.20 3 Note also that the estate might argue that the decedent
conferred
never made the requisite transfer, in that rights were not volitionally conferred
4
on the heirs.2204
0 Also, even assuming that the section can be triggered
triggered where the
of law, I.R.C. § 2036 might
decedent's
conferred solely by operation oflaw,
decedent's rights are conferred
be inapplicable
inapplicable because
because it can apply only when a decedent makes a transfer. 02055
of I.R.C. § 2037 in the case ofa
of a giving seller who
Consider the application ofI.R.C.
§
2037, the valueofa
value of a
opens.
Under
I.R.C.
before
the
termination
window
dies
termination
decedent's
decedent's gross estate includes the value of all property:

...
made a
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has ...
transfer (except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
ifconsideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, ifof the property can, through
(1)
through ownership
(1) possession or enjoyment ofthe
of such interest, be obtained
obtained only by surviving
surviving the decedent, and
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest
(2)
interest in the
interest
property..... and
and the
the value
of such
such reversionary
property.
value of
reversionary interest
of the
immediately
immediately before death of the decedent exceeds 55 percent
percent ofthe
value of such property.206
property.2°
In effect, 1.R.C.
I.R.C. § 2037 includes in the decedent's gross estate transfers that are
207
207 For I.R.C. 2037 to
essentially testamentary in nature.
I.R.C. §
apply, four tests must
must
0 8 Second,
Second, the
decedent,208
be satisfied. First, there must be a transfer by the decedent.
of the
the property"
property" must be
be conditioned
conditioned on
on
heirs' "possession
"possession or
or enjoyment
enjoyment of
heirs'
decedent.20 9 Third, the decedent
surviving the decedent,209
decedent must have "retained an interest

203.
203. It is possible to reconcile
reconcile Rev. Rul. 2004-264 with these cases. Compare
Compare Rev. Rul.
of the right to receive distributions
2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7 (positing the affirmative retention ofthe
2004-64,2004-2
Hinds, 180 F.2d at 932 ("[T]he
("[T]he taxpayer retained neither 'the possession or
from the trust), with Hinds,
property....
."), and
and Wyly,
1294
enjoyment of,
of, or the right to the income from,'
from,' the property
...."),
Wy/y, 610 F.2d at 1294
("We have further held that the interest arises only by operation
operation of a mandatory definition
("We
definition
contained in the Texas constitution
constitution which spouses may not circumvent,
circumvent, and that thus it is
of the Act, nor arisen 'under'
'retained' within the meaning
neither 'retained'
meaning ofthe
'under' the transfers concerned.").
concerned.").
of the gross estate
204. See l.R.C.
I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2006) ("The
("The value ofthe
estate shall include the value of
of
all property
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
decedent has at any time made a
transfer...
." (emphasis added».
added)).
transfer . ..."
1972) ("[I.R.C. § 2036]
of Skifter v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 699,703 (2d Cir. 1972)("[l.R.C.
205. See Estate ofSkifter
2036] is
clearly not triggered in this case because
because it only applies to a power retained by the grantor over
transferred it to another.").
the income from property when he transferred
another.").
206.
206. I.R.C.
l.R.C. § 2037(a).
(1916).
207.
64-271, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 756, 777-78 (1916).
1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271,
207. Revenue
Revenue Act of 1916,
208. I.R.C. § 2037(a).
AL., FEDERAL ESTATE &
&GIFT TAXATION
TAXATION
2037(a)(1); RiCHARD
STEPHENS ET AL.,
209. Id.
Id. § 2037(a)(I);
RICHARD B. STEPHENS
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' Fourth, the
in the property that may bring the property back to the decedent.
decedent.",,210
interest immediately
immediately before death must exceed five
value of the decedent's interest
property. 21'
the property.211
of the
value of
of the value
percent ofthe
Unlike I.R.C. §§ 2036, I.R.C. § 2037 clearly contemplates
contemplates that it may apply
12
even when the decedent's retained right arises by operation oflaw.
of law.2212
Thus, the
decedent's termination right can result in inclusion under this section in that, as
the section requires, the decedent's
decedent's spouse and heirs can only enjoy their rights
if the value
by surviving the decedent. Nonetheless, the section will not apply ifthe
of the decedent's interest immediately before death is less than five percent of
of
of the copyright (inclusive ofthe
of the value ofthe
of the termination right). Nor
the value ofthe
will it apply if the decedent is found not to have made a transfer because the
213
creation
termination rights is nonvolitional
nonvolitional in nature.213
creation of the termination
Under I.R.C. §§ 2038, the value of a decedent's gross estate includes any
interest
in property
property of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer
interest in
(except, as under I.R.C. §§ 2036, "in the case ofa
of a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth") where enjoyment of the
property was
was subject to the decedent's power to revoke, alter, amend, or
property
or
214
terminate. 214
§§ 2036 and 2037, I.R.C. § 2038 has no
Note that unlike I.R.C. §§
retention requirement. A giving author in effect possesses
possesses a right to revoke the
interests
of
the
transferee
(with
respect
to
the
copyright)
of his
interests ofthe transferee
copyright) and the interests ofhis
or her heirs (with respect to the termination rights) at certain times. 221515 Should
Should
this author die before the period for exercise
of the termination
exercise ofthe
termination right, however,
l6 for,
no amount should be included
§ 2038,
included in the author's estate under I.R.C. §
2038,216
unlike I.R.C. §§ 2036, I.R.C. §
§ 2038 does not apply where the decedent's power
power
217
had been subject to an outstanding contingency
contingency at the time of death.217
The

4.09[l] (8th ed. 2002).
1[4.09[1]
I.R.C. § 2037(a)(2)
2037(a)(2) (2006).
210. l.R.C.
211. Id.
211.
Id.
212. Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(f) (1958).
(1958).
213. See supra
nonvolitional nature
213.
supra Part III.B.2
III.B.2 (discussing
(discussing the nonvo1itional
nature of termination
termination rights).
I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1).
2038(a)(1).
214. l.R.C.
215. Supra Part II.
216.
("The value ofthe
of the gross estate shall
216. See
See I.R.C.
l.R.C. § 2038(a)(1)
2038(a)(1) (2006)
(2006) (liThe
shall include
include the value
of all
the enjoyment
any
of
all property...
property ... where
where the
enjoyment thereof
thereof was subject
subject at the date of his death to any
a power
."). The
change through the exercise of
ofa
power ...
... to
to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate
terminate ...
....").
statute also
the gross estate
estate "where any
any such
such power is relinquished
relinquished during
during
statute
also includes
includes property in the
the
the decedent's
decedent's death."
death." Id.
Id. As discussed earlier, the
the
the 3-year
3-year period ending on the date of the
imposition of
gift tax
of voluntariness. Supra
imposition
ofgift
tax requires
requires some
some showing
showing ofvoluntarlness.
Supra Part II.B.2.
III.B.2. This assumes
assumes
all relevant
all
relevant notice requirements have been
been met. Supra
Supra Part
Part II.
217.
20.2038-1(b) (as
(as amended
amended in 1962)
1962) ("[S]ection
("[S]ection 2038 is not
217. See
See Treas.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(b)
applicable to a power
which was subject
applicable
power the
the exercise
exercise of
ofwhich
subject to a contingency
contingency beyond
beyond the decedent's
decedent's
control
").
....").
control which
which did not occur
occur before
before his
his death
death ....
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requirement that
that the
the author
author be
be alive
alive at
at the
the time
time the
the termination
termination window
window
requirement
of
I.R.C.
application
opens-a
contingency
that
did
not
occur-precludes
application
of
I.R.C.
opens-a contingency that did not occur-precludes
218
2038.
§ 2038.218
Consider whether
whether I.R.C.
I.R.C. § 2041
2041 might
might apply
apply to the
the giving
giving author
author who
who dies
Consider
of a decedent's
decedent's
before the
the termination
termination period. Under
Under I.R.C.
I.R.c. § 2041,
2041, the
the value
value of
before
gross estate
estate includes
includes "any
"any property
property with
with respect
respect to
to which
which the decedent
decedent has
has at
gross
2
1
9
time of
of his death
death a general
general power
power of
ofappointment.,,219
general power
power of
of
A general
appointment."
the time
appointment is
is any "power which is exercisable
exercisable in
in favor of the decedent,
decedent, his
appointment
of his estate.,,220
When aa giving or
or selling
selling
estate, his
his creditors
creditors or the creditors
creditors of
estate., 220 When
estate,
author transfers
transfers an
an interest in a copyright,
copyright, federal
federal copyright
copyright law
law creates
creates in
in the
author
2211
22
But
But is a
the right to reappoint
reappoint the property
property to himself
himself or herself.
author the
copyright
appointment?
copyright termination
termination right a general power of appointment?
I.R.C. § 2041
The
The Treasury
Treasury Regulations
Regulations define as outside
outside the scope of
ofJ.R.C.
2041 any
decedent's date of death that is subject
subject to conditions
power existing as of a decedent's
power
222 If a giving
giving author
author dies before
before a copyright
copyright termination right is
precedent.222
exercisable, then the condition
condition precedent has not been satisfied
satisfied and
and no amount
exercisable,
223
To illustrate, consider this
this
should be included in the author's gross estate.223
example:

Hypothetical
Hypothetical 4. X transfers property in trust, payable
payable to Y
Y upon request,
"when
if the
Y's
"when and
and if
the Washington
Washington Nationals
Nationals win
win aa World
World Series
Series during
during Y's
lifetime."
lifetime." Y dies without
without the Washington
Washington Nationals ever having won a
World Series.
In Hypothetical
Hypothetical 4, Y's power is exercisable only if and when the Washington
Nationals win the World Series. Such a win did not occur during Y's lifetime
of
of appointment for purposes of
Ydoes
and, therefore, Y
does not have a general power ofappointment
224
to
copyright
a
I.R.C. §§ 2041.
2041.224 By analogy, where a giving author transfers
subject
of which was subject
exercise ofwhich
applicable to aa power the exercise
("[S]ection 2038 is not applicable
id. ("[S]ection
218. See id.
....
control which did not occur before his death ....").
to a contingency beyond the decedent's control
2041(a)(2).
219. I.R.C.
I.R.C. §§2041(a)(2).
219.
Id.
2041(b)(1).
220. [d.
§§ 2041(b)(1).
his
author may exercise his
under which an author
supraPart
Part IIII (discussing the conditions under
221. See
See supra
the copyright).
copyright).
transfer of
of the
terminate aa transfer
right to terminate
right
only
exercisable only
by its
its terms
terms isisexercisable
power which
which by
20.2041-3(b) (1997) ("[A] power
Treas. Reg.
Reg. §§ 20.2041-3(b)(1997)("[A]
222. Treas.
not
which did
did not
contingency which
event or
or aacontingency
ofan
an event
lifetime of
decedent's lifetime
the decedent's
during the
upon the
the occurrence
occurrence during
upon
of the
the
date of
on the
the date
in existence
existence on
power in
time isis not
not aa power
or occur during such time
in
in fact take
take place or
of appointment
appointment
general power
power of
given aa general
was given
decedent was
For example, if aa decedent
decedent's
death."). For
decedent's death.").
if he
or only
only ifhe
another person,
person, or
survived another
only ifhe
ifhe survived
certain age,
age, only
he reached aacertain
after he
exercisable only after
exercisable
the decedent's
decedent's
the date
date of
of the
on the
be ininexistence
existence on
would not
not be
the power would
died
descendants, the
died without descendants,
Id.
occurred. [d.
had not
not occurred.
to its
its exercise
exercise had
condition precedent to
death ifthe
if the condition
223. [d.
Id.
224.
224. [d.
Id.

HeinOnline -- 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 61 2010

62

67 WASH. &
& LEE L. REV. 25 (2010)
(2010)

another, that transfer is revocable if the author lives to deliver the requisite
termination notice. 225 If the giving author dies before the termination
tennination window
tennination
226 The
opens, the author could not have a general power of appointment.226
if the author dies during
results under I.R.C. §§ 2041 may be different, however, ifthe
or after the period of termination.
tennination.222277 In addition, an argument also might be
be
made by
the
estate
that
I.R.C.
2041
not
apply
self-created
§
does
to
a
self-created
author's
22 8
power. 228
Finally, I.R.C. § 2033 cannot
cannot apply given that the decedent
decedent could not
control
control by will the disposition of the termination
tennination right or any other interest in
229
the copyright
copyright at her death.229

If the Giving
Giving Author Dies During
of Termination
2. If
During Period
Period ofTermination
of a giving author's death during the
Consider next the tax consequences
consequences ofa
period in which she may exercise the termination
tennination right. In such a case,
inclusion in the author's gross estate may occur under
under these sections: I.R.C.
230
2038.230
§§ 2036(a)(1),
2036(a)(1), 2036(a)(2), 2037, and 2038.
To begin, consider
consider these facts:
supra note 31 and accompanying
accompanying text (explaining that as long as notice is given,
225. See supra
copyright still becomes
his
the author can die before termination
termination actually occurs
occurs and the copyright
becomes part
part of
ofhis
or her estate).
226. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(b)
(1997) (explaining that only ifthe
if the condition precedent
20.2041-3(b) (1997)
precedent
to the power
power of appointment has occurred can the decedent
decedent exercise that power).
227. See I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2)
("[T]he power
considered to
2041(a)(2) (2006) ("[T)he
power of appointment shall
shall be considered
death..,
exist on the date of the decedent's
decedent's death
... whether or not on or before
before the date of the
the
decedent's death notice
notice has been given or the power has been exercised.").
exercised.").
228. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1
(b)(2) (1997) ("For purposes of §§ 20.2041-1 to 20.204120.2041 20.2041-1(b)(2)(1997)("Forpurposesof§§
3, the term
'power ofappointment'
of appointment' does not include
term 'power
include powers reserved by the decedent to himself
himself
89-16-032
within the concept of sections 2036 through 2038."); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-16-032
20.2041-1(b)(2)
(Jan. 19, 1989) ("Section 20.2041-1
(b)(2) of the Estate Tax Regulations provides
provides that, for
of sections 20.2041-1
20.2041-1 to 20.2041-3, the term 'power
'power ofappointment'
of appointment' does not include
purposes ofsections
within the concept of sections
sections 2036 to 2038.
2038.").
powers reserved
reserved by the decedent
decedent to himself
hirnselfwithin
").
229. Infra
1; see also
also Mitchell
Postmortem Rights ofPublicity:
of Publicity:
Infra Part IV.C.
IV.C.l;
Mitchell M. Gans et al.,
aI., Postmortem
Property Rights, 117 YALE
YALE L.J.
The Federal
Federal Estate
Estate Tax Consequences
Consequences of New State-Law Property
PocKET PART
POCKET
PART 203, 203, 206-09 (2008), available
available at http://www.yalelawjournal.
http://www.yalelawjournal.
org/images/pdfs/658.pdf (discussing
org/irnages/pdfs/658.pdf
(discussing the disadvantages
disadvantages of a California state law that permits
descendible rights ofpublicity
of publicity without limiting the decedent's
descendible
decedent's ability to control the disposition
of any postmortem
of publicity); Mitchell M. Gans et al.,
of
ofany
postmortem rights ofpublicity);
aI., The Estate
Estate Tax Fundamentals
Fundamentals of
Celebrity
and Control,
Control, 118
L.J. POCKET
PoCKET PART 50, 51 (2007), available
Celebrity and
118 YALE LJ.
available at
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/709.pdf
(stating that I.R.C. § 2033 "applies only
only
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/709.pdf(stating
where the decedent
decedent has the ability to exercise
exercise post-death
post-death control").
230. See Helvering
Helvering v. Safe
Balt., 316 U.S. 56, 60 (1942)
(1942) (noting
Safe Deposit &
& Trust Co. of BaIt.,
oneself does not require estate
that the power
power to appoint
appoint trust property
property to oneselfdoes
estate tax inclusion
inclusion under the
predecessor
also infra Part III.B.3
predecessor statute to I.R.C. § 2033); see also
m.B.3 (noting that a copyright
termination right does not require inclusion
inclusion under I.R.C. § 2702).
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Hypothetical5. Author is the creator and owner
Hypothetical
owner of a copyright
copyright having a
fair market value of $20,000. On February
February 1, 2009, Author gives the
copyright
PersonB and receives no consideration
consideration in return. Author dies
copyright to Person
on February
February 2, 2044, when the termination
termination window
window is open.
open.
In Hypothetical
Hypothetical 5,
5, Author dies during the period in which the copyright transfer
transfer
could be revoked. Thus, if
the estate is unable to sustain an argument based on
ifthe
on
the elements ofretention
of retention and transfer, inclusion
inclusion in the gross estate should occur
occur
231
under I.R.C. § 2036.
2036.231
ofretention,
In addition, without
regard to the question ofretention,
232
may apply.
2038 mayapply.232
and 2038
§§ 2037 and
I.R.C. §§
Consider
of I.R.C. § 2041 in the case of an
Consider next the potential application
application ofI.R.C.
author who dies during the termination
If, in Hypothetical
termination period. If,
Hypothetical 5, Author (as
opposed
created
opposed to copyright law) is deemed
deemed for estate tax purposes to have
created the
233
2041 likely
§ 2041
herself, I.R.C.
termination
termination right in herself,
I.R.C. §
likely does
does not
not apply.
apply.233

3.

Dies After Termination
If the Giving Author Dies
Termination Window Closes
Closes

Consider next the tax consequences of a giving author's death after the
termination
termination window closes. In such a case, different
different rules might trigger
inclusion in the author's gross estate.
Hypothetical
6. Author is the creator and owner of a copyright. On
Hypothetical 6.
1, 2009, Author gives the copyright
copyright to Person
February 1,2009,
Person B and receives no
consideration in return. Author dies on February 1,2054
1, 2054 (five years after
after
consideration
the termination window closed),
delivered any notice of
of
closed), without having delivered
termination.
termination.
231. Note, however, that Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1
20.2036-1 does not contain a rule similar to that
231.
§§ 20.2038-1(b)
found in Treas. Reg. §§
20.2038-1 (b) and 20.2041-3(b),
20.2041-3(b), which makes irrelevant
irrelevant any conditions
precedent
to the
the exercise.
exercise. Compare
CompareTreas.
20.2036-1 (as
in2008)
2008) (referring
to
precedent to
Treas. Reg.
Reg. §
§ 20.2036-1
(as amended
amended in
(referring to
retention, but not
not conditions precedent),
Treas. Reg.
Reg. §§ 20.2038-1
20.2038-1 (b)(as
(b)(as amended
amended in
in 1962)
1962)
retention,
precedent), with Treas.
(making I.R.C.
I.R.C. §§ 2038
2038 inapplicable
to "a
power the
exercise of
which was
(making
inapplicable to
"a power
the exercise
of which
was subject
subject to
to aa
contingency beyond the decedent's
decedent's control
control which
which did
did not occur
occur before
before his
his death"),
death"), and Treas.
contingency
20.2041-3(b) (1997)
(1997) (stating that a power "which
"which by its terms isis exercisable only upon
Reg. § 20.2041-3(b)
the occurrence
occurrence during the
the decedent's lifetime
lifetime ofan
of an event or a contingency
the
contingency which did not in fact
take place
or occur
occur during
during such
such time
time is
power in
in existence
of the decedent's
decedent's
take
place or
is not
not aa power
existence on
on the
the date
date ofthe
death").
232. See Estate ofSkifterv.
of Skifter v. Comm'r,
1972) (indicating there is
is
Corom'r, 468 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir. 1972)
no retention requirement
requirement under I.R.C. § 2038); Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(f)
20.2037-1(f) (indicating
(indicating that
I.R.C. §§ 2037
2037 applies
applies even
even if
retained right
right arises by operation
law).
I.R.C.
ifretained
operation of
oflaw).
233. See Treas. Reg.
Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(b)(2)
(as amended
amended in
in 1961);
1961); I.R.C.
I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(1)
(2006)
20.2041-1 (b)(2)(as
2041(a)(I)(2006)
(stating that the value of the gross estate includes "property with respect to which
which a general
appointment created
21, 1942, is
is exercised
exercised by the decedent");
decedent"); see
power of
ofappointment
created on or before October 21,
also Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(a)(2)
20.2041-3(a)(2) (1997)
(1997) ("If
the power is a general power ofappointment,
of appointment, the
also
("Ifthe
value of an interest in property subject to such a power is includable in a decedent's gross
estate.").
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In Hypothetical
Hypothetical 6, Author dies after the expiration of
the period for exercise of
of
ofthe
the termination
termination right. In that case, the passage of time has extinguished
extinguished both
Author's tennination
termination right and any tennination
termination rights to which his heirs might have
succeeded. It is not likely that any amount will be included in Author's gross estate
237
2038.237
under I.R.C. §§ 2033,234
2033/34 2036,235
2036,235 2037,236
2037,236 or 2038.
But consider the potential
I.RC. § 2514.238
2514.238
gift tax consequences under I.R.C.
I.R.C. § 2514, a general
Under I.RC.
general power of appointment is any power which is
exercisable in favor of
the powerholder, her estate, her creditors, or the creditors of
of
exercisable
ofthe
240
2239
39
24
0
A lapse of
To the
her estate.
ofaa power is considered a release of the power.
the property subject
extent that the value of
ofthe
subject to the lapse
lapse (in
(in Hypothetical 6, the value
$5,000, the lapse
of the copyright) exceeds
exceeds $5,000,
lapse triggers
triggers gift tax liability under I.R.C.
I.RC.
241
§ 2514.
2514.241
termination right is a power of appointment,
In Hypothetical
Hypothetical 6, if the tennination
then the giving author's failure to exercise
exercise it would be treated as a taxable lapse (or
42
Upon the
release) of a power of appointment, if the lapse is a completed gift.
gift.2242
234. See supra
does not
supra note 230 (discussing how the power to appoint
appoint property to oneself
oneselfdoes
predecessor statute
require estate tax inclusion under the predecessor
statute to I.R.C. § 2033).
235. See I.R.C. § 2036(a) (stating that the value ofthe
of the gross estate includes any interest of
of
which the decedent
decedent has made a transfer
transfer under which
which he has retained "for any period
period which does
not in fact end before
of transferred property or the
before his death" possession, income or enjoyment oftransferred
right to designate
designate possession, income from, or enjoyment
enjoyment of the property).
236. See id.
id. § 2037 (providing
of transfers that, among other things,
(providing for estate tax inclusion oftransfers
become possessory
possessory only by surviving decedent).
decedent).
237. If
IfAuthor
of the expiration of
the termination
Author dies within three years ofthe
ofthe
termination window, then the
full value
value of the copyright may be included in Author's
Author's gross estate.
estate. See id.
id. § 2035(a)
2035(a)
(providing for the inclusion
"relinquished a
inclusion of certain property in gross estate if the decedent
decedent "relinquished
power with respect to any property, during the three-year
three-year period ending on the date of the
decedent's
decedent's death").
238. See id.
id. § 2514 (describing tax treatment
property subject to powers ofappointment
of appointment
treatment of
ofproperty
and defining term).
id. § 25l4(c)("[T]he
2514(c) ("[T]he term 'general
of appointment' means a power which
239. See id.
'general power ofappointment'
is exercisable
exercisable in favor ofthe
of the individual possessing the power
... his estate, his creditors, or the
power ...
creditors of his estate.").
estate.").
id. § 2041
2041(b)(2)
of appointment created
21,
240. See id.
(b)(2) ("The lapse of
ofaa power ofappointment
created after October
October 21,
1942, during the life ofthe
of the individual possessing
of such
1942,
possessing the power
power shall be considered a release ofsuch
power.").
Id. § 2514(e).
241. Id.
25l4(e). The statute says the following:
The lapse ofpower
of power of
appointment...
ofappointment
... during the life of the individual possessing
the power shall be considered a release
release of such power ...
... only to the extent
extent that the
property
property which
which could have been appointed
appointed by the exercise
exercise of such lapsed power
power
the property
exceeds in value the greater of [$5,000 or 5% of
ofthe
property subject
subject to the power].
Id.
Id.
242. See id.
id. § 2511 (providing
(providing that gift tax is imposed on all direct and indirect
indirect gifts).
Because
is aa completed
Because it is
completed gift, there is a potential double taxation issue, given that I.R.C. § 2702
of any retained interest at zero. See id.
id. § 2702 (liThe
("The value
of any retained
sets the value ofany
value ofany
retained interest
which
is not
shall be treated as being zero.");
also Treas. Reg. § 25.2702which is
not aa qualified
qualified interest
interest shall
zero."); see also
25.2702-
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giving author's subsequent death on February 1,
1, 2054 (five years after the
closed), the author would
would no longer possess a power of
of
termination window closed),
appointment, so for estate tax purposes, there would be no estate tax inclusion under
243
2041.243
I.R.C. §§ 2041.
C. The Selling
Selling Author Confronts
ConfrontsEstate
C.
Estate Tax
An author who sells or licenses an interest in a copyright faces many of the
estate tax challenges that a giving author does. The author's termination right is
exercisable during a specified period after the transfer,z44
transfer. 244 This section explores the
consequences of a selling author's death before, during, and after the
estate tax consequences
termination period.

1. Jfthe
If the Selling Author Dies
DiesBefore Termination
Termination Window Opens
1.
Ifan
If
::m author licenses
licenses a copyright
copyright to a third party and then dies before the time at
which she could exercise her termination rights, then I.R.C.
I.R.c. §§ 2033 will include in
245
the author's estate the value ofthe
of the author's anticipated
anticipated royalties under the license.245
If,for example, the author sold a copyright in return for a right to receive $1,000
If,
$1,000 per
year for twenty years, and the author died after the first year of
the transfer, then the
ofthe
6(a) (1992)
(providing additional
adjustments to mitigate double taxation where the amount of
of
6(a)
(1992) (providing
additional adjustments
the
transferor's property
was previously
the transferor's
property was
previously determined under I.R.C. § 2702). It might also be
noted
that if
the author
author received
received consideration
ifthe
consideration in exchange
exchange for allowing the termination interest
noted that
to
then the
the ordinary-course-of-business
ordinary-course-of-business exception
exception might
might be applicable.
applicable. See Treas. Reg.
to lapse,
lapse, then
bona fide
fide exception).
for example, where an author licenses a copyright
§§ 25.2512-8
25.2512-8 (the
(the bona
exception). So, for
and
then decides
interest to
she wishes
wishes to retain
retain the
and then
decides to
to allow
allow the
the termination
termination interest
to lapse
lapse because
because she
valuable
licensing fee,
the ordinary-course-of-business
exception should preclude
preclude aa taxable gift
valuable licensing
fee, the
ordinary-course-of-business exception
gift
from occurring.
243. See
I.R.C. §§ 2041
2041(a)
(2006) ("The
include...
243.
See I.R.C.
(a) (2006)
(liThe value of the gross estate shall include
... any
any
property
which aa general
general power
appointment..,.. is exercised
exercised by the
property with
with respect
respect to
to which
power of appointment.
decedent
such aa power or the complete release
... but
but the
the failure
failure to
to exercise
exercise such
release of such a power
decedent ...
shall
three years
shall not
not be
be deemed
deemed an
an exercise
exercise thereof."). Note that if the lapse occurs less than three
before
included in
before the
the decedent's
decedent's death,
death, then the gift tax paid
paid on the
the taxable lapse is included
in the
decedent's
id. § 2035(b)
("The amount
2035(b) (liThe
amount of the
the gross estate...
estate ... shall be
be
decedent's gross
gross estate.
estate. See id.
increased
any tax
decedent or
or his estate
on any gift
gift made
ofany
tax paid..,
paid ... by
by the
the decedent
estate on
made by the
the
increased by
by the
the amount
amount of
decedent...
during the
ending on the date
date of the decedent's
death.").
the 3-year
3-year period
period ending
decedent's death.").
decedent ... during
244.
244. Compare
Compare supra
supra Part
Part IV.B (describing
(describing the estate tax consequences
consequences when
when a giving
giving
author
lV.C (describing
(describing the
the
author dies
dies before,
before, during,
during, or
or after
after the
the termination
termination period), with supra Part IV.C
estate
estate tax consequences
consequences when a selling
selling author
author dies before,
before, during, or after the termination
termination
period).
245. See I.R.C. § 2033 ("The
the gross
all property
(liThe value of
ofthe
gross estate
estate shall
shall include
include the value
value of
ofall
property
to the extent
interest therein
therein of the
the decedent
decedent at
at the time of
of his death.").
death.").
extent of the interest
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death) of
author's
the author's date of
author's estate
estate would
would include
include the present value (as of
ofthe
ofdeath)
of
receive $19,000,
$19,000, the remaining payments
payments due
due under
under the
the license
license
the right to246receive
agreement.246
agreement.
of any value attributable
Consider whether
whether I.R.C. § 2033 requires
requires inclusion ofany
attributable to
247
heirs.247
by
the
author's
in
the
future
could
be
exercised
rights
that
the termination
termination
exercised
the
Regardless
Regardless of when a giving or selling
selling author
author dies in relation
relation to a prior copyright
copyright
transfer, the value
value of these termination rights should escape
escape inclusion in the
the
gross estate
estate under I.R.C. § 2033
2033 by analogy to wrongful
wrongful death
decedent's gross
48 Recall that termination
the author is not alive
termination rights arise in heirs only if
ifthe
benefits.2248
249
when they
they become exercisable.
exercisable,z49 The Service
Service has ruled that state law wrongful
applicable
are not included
included in a decedent's
decedent's gross estate
estate when the applicable
death benefits are
decedent's heirs-as
heirs--as opposed to the decedent's
decedent's estate-a cause
statute creates in the decedent's
50
otherwise exist during the decedent's
decedent's lifetime.
lifetime,zso
of action that did not otherwise
51
5
In Maxwell Trust v. Commissioner,
Commissioner/ ' the United States Tax Court addressed
addressed
crash
oftwo American
of whether the estates oftwo
the question ofwhether
American citizens, killed in a plane crash
settlement proceeds
ofsettlement
proceeds received
received by their heirs in a
in Japan, should include the value of
z 2 In that case, the court noted that under applicable local
wrongful death action. 252
id. § 2039(a) ("The gross estate shall include
246. See id.
include the value of an annuity or other
other
of
beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent
payment receivable
receivable by any beneficiary
decedent under any form of
payment
if,
contract
contract or agreement...
agreement ... if,
under such contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment was
of a decedent under
payable to the decedent."). Upon receipt, these royalties become income ofa
payable
I.R.C. § 691(a) and are subject to unfavorable taxation. See id.
id. § 691(a) (treating, for tax
amount...
inclusion purposes, "the right...
right ... to receive an amount
... as if it had been acquired by the
originally
income was originally
estate or such person in the transaction in which the right to receive the income
derived").
of all property to
of the gross estate shall include the value ofall
id. § 2033 ("The value ofthe
247. See id.
death.").
the extent of the interest
interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.").
and Control,
Control,supra
of Celebrity and
Estate Tax Fundamentals
FundamentalsofCelebrity
al., The Estate
248. See Gans et aI.,
supra note
interest post-death
229, at 51 (stating that a decedent's ability to control an interest
post-death is necessary
necessary for
claim
estate tax inclusion under § 2033,
2033, and that, because a living person has no wrongful
wrongful death claim
during life, damages
damages received
received under such a claim are not included in that person's
person's gross estate).
also I.R.C.
see also
supra Part II (describing the termination rights of an author); see
249. See supra
249.
of which the decedent
of the estate includes any interest ofwhich
(2006) (stating that the value ofthe
§ 2036(a) (2006)
has made a transfer under which he has retained "for any period which does not in fact end
property").
of, or the right to income from, the property").
death..,
before his death
... the possession or enjoyment of,
Rul. 69-8, 1969-1 C.B. 219 ("The decedent in his lifetime never had an interest
250. Rev. Rui.
250.
interest
action or the proceeds. Therefore, with respect to damages recoverable
in either the right of action
beneficiaries which would be includible
under the Act, nothing passed from the decedent to the beneficiaries
in his gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes.").
in result,
result,1973-2
1973-2 C.B. 2
acq. in
444,451(1972),
58 T.C. 444,
Trust v. Comm'r, 58
251. See Maxwell Trustv.
451 (1972), acq.
death proceeds
proceeds in the
(holding that because local law vested the rights to the wrongful death
decedents' gross estates did
dependents of the decedents and not in the decedents themselves, decedents'
2033).
not include the value of the proceeds under I.R.C. § 2033).
whether the
section 2033 turns upon whether
under section
id. at 448 ("The dispute in this case under
252. See id.
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decedents themselves had no such wrongful death claim against the airline
law, the decedents
2
or the airplane manufacturer.253
" Because the local law "vested
"vested the rights to
to
of the decedents and not in the decedents
[wrongful death claims] in the dependents ofthe
themselves or their estates," the court ruled that "section 2033 does not require
254
decedents.f,,254
the decedents.
of the
estates of
gross estates
the gross
in the
proceeds in
inclusion of the settlement proceeds
Concededly, copyright termination rights are different. Unlike wrongful death
damages, the author is entitled to the termination right during life (though subject to
contingency that the author must survive until the rights are exercisable). This
the contingency
difference, however, is not one of consequence. For whenever a right is
extinguished
or otherwise disappears at the decedent's death, I.R.C. §§ 2033 cannot
255
apply.
apply.255
of I.R.C. § 2036, the Service
In terms ofI.R.C.
Service likely would argue that the elements
elements of
of
only the
transfer and retention are present and the estate therefore should include not onlythe
termination
present value of the royalty stream but also the present value of the tennination
256
right. 256 Because
Because the author received valuable consideration, the estate likely would
of the
decedents had at the time of their deaths a claim against BOAC and Boeing on account
account ofthe
airplane crash which passed to their estates.").
estates.").
253. Id.
Id. at 451-52.
254.
Id. at 451.
254. Id.
451.
255. Helvering
56, 60 (1942);
(1942); Wadewicz
Wadewicz v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.
Helvering v. Safe Deposit, 316 U.S. 56,60
925,934-35 (1963).
925,934--35
(1963).
256. Eisen &
supranote 10,
applying
& Biblin, supra
10, at 7. Eisen and Biblin illustrate
illustrate the effects
effects of
ofapplying
I.R.C. § 2036, though
though they argue against its application
application on the ground that the element
element of
of
an author (referred
retention is absent. They use an example of
ofan
(referred to as an "Entertainer")
"Entertainer") who dies
dies
with a $21
copyright catalogue
$21 million
million estate, comprised
comprised of $1 million in cash and a copyright
catalogue "worth"
$20 million
million in copyrights. The Entertainer
Entertainer makes
makes a prior transfer of some of the copyrights,
copyrights,
retaining a royalty
$12 million at the time of the
royalty interest valued, for illustration purposes, at $12
Entertainer's death. Id.
Id. The
Entertainer's
The Entertainer dies prior to the period in which he may exercise
exercise his
termination
Id. Eight million
of the proceeds
termination rights. Id.
million dollars
dollars is the assumed
assumed date-of-death
date-of-death value ofthe
proceeds
from aa fictive
fictive future sale of the post-termination
post-termination interest. Eisen and Biblin believe
from
believe that
that
the only amount that should be subject to estate tax upon the Entertainer's
Entertainer's death is
is
the $12
$12 million. Under the willing buyer/willing seller test for measuring value, all
all
that a willing buyer would
would pay
pay for the
the rights that the Entertainer
Entertainer had was $12
million. At the instant of
the Entertainer's
ofthe
Entertainer's death,
death, if his estate attempted to sell its
entire interest in the copyrights
copyrights to a third-party
third-party purchaser,
purchaser, all that purchaser
purchaser could
could
acquire
acquire would
would be
be the right
right to receive
receive royalties until a termination
termination took place. No
No
additional
additional rights could be
be acquired
acquired from the Entertainer's
Entertainer's estate.
estate. *• *• *•
The IRS might not agree
agree with
with the
the above
above result. In
In the above example,
example, $8
$8 million of
of
value was excluded
of this amount that will
excluded from the Entertainer's
Entertainer's estate. The half
halfofthis
will
be enjoyed
enjoyed by the surviving spouse
spouse would have been sheltered
sheltered by
by the marital
deduction in any event, but the
the $4 million
million of
of value that went
went to descendants
descendants
effectively
inclusion
effectively "escaped
"escaped the system."
system." The
The IRS might argue
argue that estate
estate tax inclusion
should result
result under Section
Section 2036
2036 on the theory
theory that
that the
the situation
situation is analogous
analogous to a
taxpayer transferring
transferring assets but retaining
retaining the
the income
income for himself.
himself The
The problem
problem with
with
this argument
argument is
is that
that the Entertainer
Entertainer never
never made
made a "transfer" of
of assets
assets to
to his
his
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invoke the bona fide sale exception. Ifthe estate could establish
establish that the decedent
decedent
received full and adequate consideration, the exception
exception would apply and I.R.C.
had received
§ 2036, as well as I.R.C. §§ 2037 and 2038, would be rendered inapplicable
(enabling
sidestep the retention
retention and transfer issues). Although the
(enabling the estate to sidestep
scope ofthe
of the exception is unclear, and there is no authority applying the exception in
this context, it would seem to be unavailable on the rationale
rationale that the author did not
receive
receive full consideration.
the phrase "adequate
"adequate and full
The courts disagree on the precise
precise meaning of
ofthe
consideration."
UnitedStates v. Allen in the
consideration." One approach, adopted
adopted by courts in United
2 7
Tenth Circuit,257
Estate of Gregory
Estate
Gregory v. Commissioner
Commissioner in the United States Tax
258
2 9
Court,258
and Gradow
Gradow v.
UnitedStates in the Federal
Federal Circuit,259
v. UnitedStates
requires a decedent
descendants' rights were granted
of
descendants. The descendants'
granted to them by Congress
Congress by virtue of
copyright law, and not by a transfer from the Entertainer.
the copyright
Id.
Id. (citations
(citations omitted).
916,917
Cir. 1961)(findingthat
1961) (finding that payment of
257. See United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916,
917 (10th Cir.
of
fair market value for the life estate constitutes adequate
adequate and full consideration). In
In Allen, the
decedent
trust income
which she was to receive three-fifths of
oftrust
income and her children
decedent created
created a trust from which
were to receive two-fifths oftrust
of trust income. Id.
Id at 916. Upon her death, the trust assets would pass
to her children. Id
Id. At the age of78,
of78, Mrs. Allen
Allen sold her income interest (having a stipulated
stipulated value
of
$135,000) to her son in a bonafide
bona fide sale for $140,000.
Id.at 916-17. The decedent
of$135,000)
$140,000. Id
decedent died shortly
thereafter. Id
Id. at 917. The Service argued
of the trust corpus, less the $140,000,
$140,000,
argued that three-fifths ofthe
Id. The United States
States Court
Court of Appeals
Appeals for the
should be included in Mrs. Allen's gross estate. Id
Tenth
of the value of
the trust corpus should be included in her estate,
ofthe
Tenth Circuit held that three-fifths
three-fifths ofthe
on the grounds that, "[i]t seems certain
certain in a situation like this, Congress
Congress meant the estate to include
the corpus of
the trust or, in its stead, an amount equal in value." Id
Id. at 918. Practically speaking,
ofthe
Allen's effect is to require a grantor
grantor of a trust who wishes to minimize estate tax to sell that life
life
purchaser
estate for more than its fair market
market value. This in turn raises the possibility
possibility that the purchaser
would be deemed to make a gift to the grantor. For a discussion ofAllen,
&
ofAllen, see Mitchell M. Gans &
Jonathan
CriticalAnalysis &
Suggestions, 100 TAX NOTES,
NOTES,
Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Strangi: A Critical
& Planning
Planning Suggestions,
1, 2003,
1153, 1166
1166 (2003)
Sept. 1,
2003, at 1153,
(2003) ("[T]he
("[T]he court held that the grantor does not receive full
consideration within the meaning
meaning of the exception
exception unless she receives an amount equal to what
would have been
been included in the gross estate
estate had the sale
sale not occurred.").
258. See
Estate ofGregoryv. Comm'r, 39T.C.
39 T.C. 1012, 1016 (I
(1963)
(finding that "adequate and
SeeEstateofGregoryv.
963)(finding
full consideration" requires "a comparable
comparable value which would be includable
includable in the transferor's
transferor's
Gregory,the decedent's husband predeceased
predeceased her, leaving a will that
that allowed the
gross estate"). In Gregory,
the couple's community
widow to either take under
under her share
share of
ofthe
community property or take under the will. Id
Id
at 1013. Mrs. Gregory elected to take under the will, receiving personal
personal effects, a probate
of
income interest in a trust funded by her husband's share of
homestead and family allowance,
allowance, and an income
the community
the couple's community property, which she was required
community property
property and her share
share of
ofthe
1014-15. The parties
testamentary trust. Id.
Id at 1014-15.
as a condition of the will to transfer to the testamentary
stipulated that Mrs. Gregory's income interest in the community
community property ofher
ofher husband was worth
$11,926.96;
transferred to the
$11,926.96; the value of her share
share of the community property, which she transferred
testamentary trust, was $65,925.08.
testamentary
$65,925.08. Id.
Id at 1017. The Tax Court ruled
ruled that the amount Mrs.
Gregory was deemed to receive ($11,926.96)
($11,926.96) was far less than what she transferred
transferred ($65,925.08),
($65,925.08),
Gregory
and that therefore,
of the property she transferred to the trust,
therefore, her estate
estate should include
include the value ofthe
measured as of
Mrs. Gregory's date ofdeath,
of death, less the consideration
consideration she received. Id.
1021-22.
measured
ofMrs.
Id at 1021-22.
of Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl.
(1987), aff'd,
516
259. See Estate ofGradow
Cl. Ct. 808, 816 (1987),
qff'd, 897 F.2d 516
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equal to the fair
who sold a partial interest in property to receive a consideration equal
market value ofthe
ofthe fee interest, not just the partial interest
interest that is the subject ofthe
ofthe
sale, in order for the bona fide exception to apply.
apply. The other approach, adopted by
United States v.v. Wheeler
Wheeler in the Fifth Circuit,260
Circuit,2 6° Estate
Estate of Magnin
Magnin v.
v.
courts in United
2
61
Commissioner in the Ninth CircUit,261
Circuit, and D'Ambrosio
D'Ambrosio v.
v. Commissioner
Commissioner in the
Commissioner
Third Circuit,262
Circuit, 262 requires a taxpayer to receive a consideration
consideration equal to the fair
(Fed. Cir. 1990)(finding
1990) (finding "adequate and full consideration" in "the property which would otheIWise
otherwise
of her retention of a life estate"). In
In Gradow,
Gradow,the
have been included in her gross estate by virtue ofher
predeceased her, leaving a will that allowed the widow to either take under her
decedent's husband predeceased
of the couple's community property or take under the will. [d.
Id.Mrs. Gradow elected to take
share ofthe
under the will, receiving an income interest in a trust funded by her husband's share of the
community property and her share ofthe
of the couple's
couple's community property, which she was required
required as
community
testamentary trust. [d.
Id The parties stipulated that Mrs.
aa condition
condition of the will to transfer to the testamentary
community property of her husband was worth $234,767;
Gradow's income
income interest in the community
$234,767; the
value ofher
of her share
of the community property, which she transferred
transferred to the testamentary
testamentary trust, was
share ofthe
$444,641. [d.
Id.The Claims Court held, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
$444,641.
Circuit affirmed, that Mrs. Gradow's gross estate included the value ofher
of her community property
Id.
at 816. The Claims Court reasoned
which she transferred to the trust under her husband's will. [d.
that any other rule would contradict
"Congress' judgment
contradict "Congress'
judgment that transfers with retained life estates are
testamentary transactions and should be treated as such for estate tax purposes," and
generally testamentary
permit an otherwise abusive transfer to escape taxation. [d.
Id.
260. See Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 767 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e
("[W]e hold that the
of a remainder interest for its actuarial
calculated by the appropriate
appropriate factor set forth in
actuarial value as calculated
sale ofa
the Treasury
consideration under section
Treasury Regulations
Regulations constitutes an adequate
adequate and full consideration
section 2036(a).").
2036(a).").
Wheeler, the decedent
decedent
In Wheeler,
decedent sold
sold to his sons a remainder interest
interest in a ranch in which the decedent
retained a life estate. [d.
Id.at 751.
751. The purchase
purchase price was determined
determined by reference
reference to the fair
fair market
value of the entire
entire property
property and
and accepted
accepted actuarial
actuarial principles
principles for determining
determining the value
value of the
decedent's life estate. Id.
interest-bearing note
[d. at 752. The sons paid the purchase
purchase price with
with an interest-bearing
borrowers' personal guarantees. [d.
Id.
The decedent's
decedent's executor did not include
include in his
secured by the borrowers'
gross estate any value with respect to the ranch, on the theory
exception
theory that the bona fide sale exception
under 1.RLC.
IRC. § 2036(a)(1)
2036(a)(1) applied
applied to the sale of the remainder. Id.
[d. at 753. The Fifth Circuit
embraced the interpretation
"adequate and full consideration"
consideration" in the gift tax context,
context, and
embraced
interpretation of "adequate
pronounced
pronounced the estate tax rule as follows: "[U]nless
"[U]nless a transfer that depletes
depletes the transferor's
transferor's estate is
joined with
transfer that augments the estate
joined
with aa transfer
estate by
by a commensurate
commensurate (monetary) amount there is no
of either the estate
consideration" for the purpose
purpose ofeither
estate or gift tax." Id.
[d. at 762.
"adequate and full consideration"
261.
Estate of
Magnin v.
261. See
See Estate
of Magnin
v. Comm'r,
Comm'r, 184 F.3d 1074 (9th
(9th Cir. 1998)
1998) ("[W]e
("[W)e hold that
'adequate
the remainder
consideration' is measured against the
the actuarial
actuarial value
value of
ofthe
remainder interest
interest
'adequate and full consideration'
rather
the property transferred
decedent
ofthe
transferred to the
the trust."). In Magnin,
Magnin, the
the decedent
rather than the fee-simple
fee-simple value of
and his
his father agreed
agreed that decedent would bequeath
bequeath his remainder
remainder interest in certain
certain stock the
decedent's children in return
return for the father's
father's agreement
agreement to fund a trust for the
family business
business to the decedent's
decedent's benefit, essentially giving
giving the decedent
decedent a life estate in the family business. Id.
[d. at 1075.
1075.
The
the Service
The Ninth Circuit
Circuit reversed
reversed the Tax
Tax Court's finding in
in favor of
ofthe
Service and remanded
remanded the
the case
case
for a determination
ofwhether the
of the decedent's
the value ofthe
decedent's remainder interest was
was equal to the value
determination ofwhether
of
the life estate-in
ofthe
estate-in other
other words,
words, did the decedent
decedent receive
receive adequate
adequate and
and full consideration
consideration for the
the
transfer. Id.
1082.
[d. at
at 1082.
262.
See Estate
D'Ambrosio v. Comm'r, 101 F.3d
262. See
Estate of
of D'Ambrosio
F.3d 309,
309, 318 (3d
(3d Cir. 1996)
1996) (finding
(finding that
sale ofremainder
of remainder interest
consideration"). In
interest for its fair market value
value constitutes "adequate
"adequate and
and full consideration").
sale
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market value of the partial
partial interest
interest that is the
the subject
subject of the sale. Under this
this
approach, the focus
focus is on whether
whether the transfer
transfer effects
effects depletion in the
the transferor's
transferor's
approach,
estate. The exception
exception becomes
becomes available
available because
because the
the consideration
consideration received
received for the
partial interest, together with the value of the retained
retained interest, prevents
prevents depletion
depletion
from occurring.
cases, the exception
Even
Even under this more taxpayer-friendly
taxpayer-friendly line
line of
ofcases,
exception will in all
263 For the transfer consists
the copyright
likelihood not be
be available.
available?63
For
consists not only of
ofthe
copyright but
likelihood
of the termination right to the spouse
also ofthe
spouse and children.
children. The person acquiring
acquiring the
consideration for the value
copyright does not pay any consideration
value of the termination
termination rights
copyright
conferred
conferred on the spouse and children. Thus, an author who
who sells a copyright
copyright does in
in
exception unavailable.
unavailable. To illustrate, assume
fact deplete her estate, rendering the exception
ann's-length transaction.
$18 in an arm's-length
the author conveys a copyright
copyright and receives $18
of the
right,
measured
of
the
termination
that
the
value
Assume
further
Assume
ofthe
measured at the time ofthe
half of which is attributable to the author's termination
conveyance, is $2, one halfofwhich
termination right
half of which is attributable to the termination rights conferred
and the other halfofwhich
conferred on the
if under the copyright
copyright law the author
author's spouse and children. Put differently, ifunder
copyright, the author would have
convey the termination
termination rights and the copyright,
could convey
circumstances, the transaction results in depletion in that the
received $20. In these circumstances,
$19 in assets after the
$20 but has only $19
transfers an asset having a value of
of$20
author transfers
$1 value ofthe
of the author's termination
conveyance
conveyance (the purchase
purchase price of$18 plus the $1
taxpayer-friendly approach, the author's
right). Thus, even under the taxpayer-friendly
author's estate could
not qualify for the exception. Interestingly, however, with proper planning, the
transaction could be made to qualify for the exception. Ifthe author's children
transaction
children and
$1 for their termination rights, the transaction would
spouse had paid the author $1
have resulted in no depletion, thus permitting
permitting the estate to argue for the exception
exception
cases.
under the taxpayer-friendly
taxpayer-friendly line of
ofcases.
Id.at 311.
311.
D'Ambrosio,
D 'Ambrosio, the decedent sold a remainder interest in stock for an annuity interest. Id
Id.
The parties stipulated that the remainder and the annuity had identical fair market values. Id
of whether the decedent must receive the fair market
The Third Circuit addressed the question ofwhether
market
of the fee simple
D'Ambrosio,
of the interest she sold (in D
'Ambrosio, a remainder interest) or the value ofthe
value ofthe
2036(a)(1) to
interest in the underlying property, for the bona fide exception under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(I)
Id.at 312. The court found that the decedent must receive full and adequate
apply. Id
apply.
Id at 315.
that she sold, not the underlying property. Id.
consideration for the property interest that
Gregorycourt's statement that eligibility for the bona fide
The Third Circuit agreed with the Gregory
"comparable value which would
I.R.C. § 2036 requires the transferor to receive "comparable
exception under l.R.C.
of Gregory, 39
EstateofGregory,
estate." Id.
Id.at 313 (quoting Estate
includable in the transferor's gross estate."
have been includable
of that rule, however, insofar as
Gregory'sapplication
application ofthat
T.C. at 1016). The Third Circuit rejected Gregory's
of at the
death, instead ofat
of the transferor's death,
of value at the time ofthe
Gregory court took a snapshot ofvalue
the Gregory
Id.
time of the transfer. Id
consideration" in reference
(defining "adequate and full consideration"
Magnin, 184
184 F.3d at 1080 (defining
263. See Magnin,
F.3d at 767 (same);
Wheeler, 116 F.3d
to the value of the remainder
remainder interest transferred); Wheeler,
at 318
318 (same).
D'Ambrosio, 1010 F.3d at
D'Ambrosio,
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It is unlikely that LR.C.
I.R.C. §§ 2038 would apply to a selling author who dies prior
It
are contingent upon surviving to
to the
to the termination window. The author's rights are
point at which the termination right may be exercised. This contingency precludes
the application ofLR.C.
of I.R.C. §§ 2038. If the contingency
contingency264were disregarded, this section
exception. 264
fide
bona
the
of
because
apply
not
may
because ofthe bona fide exception.
As is true with the giving author who dies prior to the termination period,
I.R.C. §§ 2041 should not apply to the selling author who dies before the termination
LR.C.
265 The copyright termination right is not a general power of appointment
period.265
266
(i.e., survival) has not been satisfied.266
because the condition precedent (Le.,
2. Ifthe
If the Selling Author Dies
DuringPeriod
of Termination
2.
Dies During
Period o/Termination
A selling author who dies during the period for exercise of the copyright
termination
consequences as one
termination interests should experience
experience the same estate tax consequences
who dies before the period of
termination, with one qualification. Because there is
is
oftermination,
no longer any outstanding
outstanding contingency
contingency (the author survived to the point at which
I.R.C. §§ 2038 and 2041 can now apply.
she could exercise the termination
termination right), LR.C.

3. Ifthe
If the Selling Author Dies After Termination
Closes
3.
Termination Window Closes
If the selling author survives the termination period without exercising
exercising her
rights-the third scenario under consideration-then
consideration-then the termination rights
267 No value attributable
evaporate.
includable in her gross
evaporate.267
attributable to these rights should be includable
268
estate
Furthermore,
estate under I.R.C.
LR.C. § 2033.268
2033.
Furthermore, there should be no inclusion under
I.R.C.
of the giving author who dies after
LR.C. §§ 2036,2037,
2036, 2037, or 2038.269
2038?69 As in the case ofthe
after
the termination
2041, standing alone, should not be sufficient
termination period, I.R.C.
LR.C. § 2041,
sufficient to
270
trigger estate
estate tax inclusion either.
either?70
Supra notes 256-62
accompanying text.
264. Supra
256-62 and accompanying
265. Supra
Supra Part IV.B.1.
IV.B.I.
266. Supra
1.
Supra Part IV.B.
IV.B.I.
267. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)
termination rights).
304(c) (2006) (defining the
the extent
extent of
oftennination
268. The remainder
remainder of Part IV.B considers
considers alternate
alternate theories
theories for estate
estate tax inclusion.
269. As
As discussed earlier,
earlier, the imposition
imposition of gift tax
tax requires
requires some
some showing
showing of
of
voluntariness.
(discussing the gift
voluntariness. See supra
supra Part
Part III.B-C
III.B-e (discussing
gift taxation of transfers
transfers of copyright
copyright
termination
Allowing the termination
termination rights). Allowing
termination right to lapse should
should not
not cause
cause I.R.C. § 2035 to
apply, even ifdeath
if death occurs
the lapse, inasmuch as the lapse occurs
occurs within three years of
ofthe
occurs without
without
any
or relinquishment
relinquishment by the
the decedent
decedent at the
the time of the lapse.
lapse. See
any volitional
volitional act of transfer or
I.R.S.
18, 1999)
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 199935003
199935003 (May
(May 18,
1999) (intimating
(intimating that I.R.C. § 2035 cannot
cannot apply
apply
in
ofaa volitional
volitional act).
in the absence
absence of
270. The
The lapse
lapse of
of the
the power might
might be
be a taxable
taxable gift
gift under
under I.R.C.
I.R.C. § 2514.
2514. See I.R.C.
I.R.C.
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summarizes the estate tax consequences
of the copyright transfers
Table B summarizes
consequences ofthe
discussed in this Part.
271
Copyright Transfers
Table B: Estate Tax Consequences
Consequences of
of Copyright
Transfers 271
Will estate tax be imposed
on...
on
...

Time of Author's Death
(in relation
period when
of
(in
relation to
to period
when notice
notice of
termination may be delivered)

Hoarding Author

§ 2037?
·..... under IRC §
2037?
§ 2038?
·..... under IRC §
2038?

§ 2041?
·..... under IRC §

)J(

xC

)J(
)K

*

*

*

$0

0

0

**
*

*
*

$0

•
•

§ 2038?
·...
.. under IRC §
under IRC §§ 2041?
·.... under

§ 2036?
·..... under IRC §
2036?

)J(
W

i*

§ 2037?
·..... under IRC §

§ 2033?
·...
.. under IRC §

After
After

*

under IRC §§2036?
2036?
·...
.. under

Selling Author
Selling
Author

During

...

Giving Author
Author
·...
.. under IRC §§ 2033?

...

Before

f

f'

*
..*
:':

xK
0$
)J(

•
0
*

***

'"

I··"

**
)J(
Wc

0$
0
4\
0$

•
0

*

*

.",

,/"

**
**

.,..".

)',.

*
*

*
*
**
**
**

Key:
w Estate tax imposed on some or entire value associated with
)J(
copyright
copyright
Under some
some circumstances
certain assumptions
assumptions are
o0 Under
circumstances and
and if
if certain
are
correct, estate tax may be imposed on some or entire
entire value
associated
infra.
associated with copyright. See analysis infra.
No
No estate
estate tax
tax consequences
consequences

*

§ 2514(e) (2006) (discussing the lapse ofa
of a power of
appointment). Note that ifthe
if the lapse occurs
ofappointment).
less than three years before the decedent's death, then the gift
gift tax paid on the taxable lapse
Id. § 2035(b). On the other hand, a selling
selling
would be includable in the decedent's gross estate. [d.
termination does not create a
oftermination
author, unlike a gifting author, may be able to argue that a lapse of
taxable gift
ordinary-course-of-business exception in Treas. Reg. 25.2512-8.
gift by reason of the ordinary-course-of-business
271. Assuming all relevant notice requirements satisfied.
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VV. Policy Concerns
Copyrights
Concerns with Sticky
Sticky Copyrights
Because
Because federal copyright
copyright law uniquely grants
grants an author
author the ability
ability to
terminate
terminate a prior
prior transfer,
transfer, authors
authors do not have
have the ability
ability to fix the transfer
transfer tax
272
value of the donated property.
property.272
Ordinarily, when
when a person makes a gift, the
Ordinarily,
value
the gifted property is its fair market
transfer tax value
value of
ofthe
market value
value as of the date of
of
transfer
273
273
inclusion,
however,
the
estate
tax
likelihood
of
Because
the transfer.
Because of the likelihood ofthe estate tax
the
the author has no ability
ability to fix the value of a copyright
copyright for wealth
wealth transfer
transfer tax
274
Although federal
purposes at the time of the initial transfer.274
federal copyright
copyright law
purposes
2 75
it actually
aims to protect
protect the author and
and her family members,
members,275
actually limits
limits an
seemingly
There
is
giving.
in
tax-effective
ability
to
engage
author's
engage in tax-effective
There seemingly little
of
rationale for this discrimination against copyrights
copyrights relative to other
other types of
property.
of copyright termination
The underlying
underlying policy goal ofcopyright
termination rights is protection for
the author. Supporters of the revised
revised federal copyright law explained
explained that
of the unequal bargaining
termination rights were necessary
necessary "because ofthe
bargaining position
work's
part from the impossibility of determining
determining a work's
of authors, resulting in part
compromise
value until it has been exploited. Section 203 reflects a practical
practical compromise
that will further the objectives
objectives of the copyright law while recognizing
recognizing the
'276
Motivated
interests
involved.
needs
of
all
problems and legitimate
interests
,,276 Motivated by the
desire to protect
protect authors, Congress appears to have
have made it difficult,
difficult, if
if not
impossible,
impossible, for authors
authors to engage in effective estate planning. The solicitude of
of
the legislature for creative individuals is salutary, but the unintended
unintended tax
277
consequences
consequences are not.277
"bump"
to "bump"
ability to
the ability
understand the
already understand
Most authors and their advisors already
278
rights,
but the
or disturb prior transfers with copyright
copyright termination rights,278

supra note 11,
11, at 765-87
272. On the benefits
benefits of fixation of value generally, see Gans, supra
(discussing rate, appreciation, and leverage
leverage benefits).
shall be
be considered
considered
date of
of the gift
gift shall
thereof at
at the date
("[T]he value
value thereof
273. See I.R.C. § 2512(a) ("[T]he
the amount of the gift.").
interests).
of copyright
copyright interests).
estate taxation
taxation of
Part IV
IV (discussing
(discussing estate
supra Part
274. See supra
10.1
AND O'rHERDoNATIVE
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 10.1
WILLS AND
See RESTATEMENT (TLRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
275. SeeREsTATEMENT(THlRD)OFPROP.:
transfers is to "facilitate rather than
of the law ofdonative
of donative transfers
(2003) (claiming the purpose ofthe
cmt.
cmt. a (2003)
regulate").
124 (1976).
(1976).
94-1476, at 124
276. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,
state legislation that creates
of state
unintended consequences
consequences of
critique of the unintended
277. For a critique
Rights ofPub/icity:
of Publicity: The
PostmortemRights
see Gans et aI.,
al., Postmortem
of publicity, see
descendible rights ofpubIicity,
retroactive descendible
Gans
and Gans
Rights,supra
PropertyRights,
of New State-Law Property
Estate Tax Consequences
ConsequencesofNew
FederalEstate
Federal
supra note 229, and
229.
and Control,
Control,supra
supra note 229.
of Celebrityand
Tax Fundamentals
FundamentalsofCelebrity
al., The
The Estate
Estate Tax
et aI.,
of estates and copyright
supranote 19 (discussing the intersection ofestates
See, e.g., Nevins, supra
278. See,
"will-bumping").
law in "will-bumping").
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scholarly literature is almost entirely
entirely silent on
on the wealth
professional and scholarly
transfer tax consequences
consequences ofthese
of these rights. To date, the Service has not sought to
enforce any of the gift or estate tax consequences
consequences of sticky copyrights. This
may be for a variety of reasons including, perhaps, the failure of the Service
and taxpayers to appreciate all of the tax consequences.
If the wealth transfer tax consequences of copyright
copyright termination rights
were better understood, vigorous markets in copyright transfers would be
hindered by the tax system. For example, an author who apprehends that her
estate will include some residual value of any copyright sale may be
discouraged from making lifetime transfers. Enforcement
Enforcement ofthe
of the wealth transfer
intellectual property, as
tax system would lead to an inefficient hoarding of intellectual
exposure. To the extent
creative individuals would seek to minimize their tax e~posure.
that an author makes a decision to exploit (or not to exploit) a copyright
copyright based
on tax considerations, the law hinders rather than protects creative individuals.
Freedom of testation and economic efficiency
efficiency are then impeded by overly
complex tax rules.
VI. Legislative
Legislative Reform to Unstick
Unstick Copyrights
VI.
Copyrights
termination
Copyrights are not like other property, admittedly. But if termination
rights created by statute-a
statute-a statute
statute meant to protect authors
authors and their heirsheirsattract
harsher
transfer
tax
treatment
than
other
assets,
then
the
tax
law
should
attract harsher transfer tax treatment
be changed. Authors, like owners
other kinds of
property, should be able to
owners of
ofother
ofproperty,
concern that termination rights will cause
gift or sell their assets without concern
cause
adverse tax consequences.
consequences. Equally important, authors should be able to make
adverse
lifetime gifts
gifts oftheir
of their copyrights
lifetime
copyrights to
to their spouses
spouses without incurring gift tax, just
just
as other property owners are permitted
permitted to do.
To remedy
remedy this inequality, Congress might consider the following
To
following
possibilities:
copyright
possibilities: First, Congress should provide
provide that a transfer of a copyright
qualifies for the marital
deduction,
thereby
eliminating
the
potential
for
gift tax
marital
thereby
potential
transfers
on
to
spouses.
Second,
Congress
on transfers
Congress should provide
provide that an author who
gifts or
sells aa copyright
of the termination
gifts
or sells
copyright is
is not
not subject
subject to
to gift
gift tax on the value
value ofthe
termination
right and that no inclusion
right
inclusion in the gross estate occurs
occurs by
by reason of these rights.
Third, Congress
Congress should adopt an early
Third,
early completion
completion rule, under
under which the full
value
of
the
copyright
(including
the
value
of
the termination
value of the copyright (including
ofthe
termination rights) is subject
subject
to gift tax at the time
to
time of the initial gift, and no amount would be includable in
the donor's
estate on
the
donor's estate
on account
account of the termination
termination rights. 279 Fourth, the author
author
279.
See, e.g.,
279. See,
e.g., Mitchell M. Gans &
& Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making it
Enforceable,
Enforceable, 87
87 B.U. L. REv.
REv. 759,
759, 789 n.
n.I117
17 (2007)
(2007) (discussing
(discussing the application
application of an
an early
early
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election: either (1) treat the termination
should be given an election:
tennination right conferred at
the time of gift or sale as having been gifted, or (2) include
include the value of the
right in the gross estate at the time of death. Any of these alternatives
alternatives would
bring welcome
continue treating
treating such
such
welcome clarity to this area of the law. But to continue
authors as if termination
rights
were
a
valuable
"string"
requiring
estate
tax
tennination
inclusion makes no sense.
VII. Conclusion
Conclusion
Federal copyright law shapes an artist's legacy, in both senses ofthe
of the word.
Through
the
terminate prior transfers, an author and the author's heirs
Through
ability to tenninate
can revisit contracts that turn out to be unwise or imbalanced.
imbalanced. Copyright
termination
revocation,
tennination rights, which are tantamount to a property law right of revocation,
control over how others use her
allow a creative individual a high degree of control
revocation comes unintended tax consequences.
consequences.
work. But with that right of revocation
Transfers during the author's lifetime, whether by gift or by sale, may have
consequences. This Article takes the position that
negative gift and estate tax consequences.
federal copyright
copyright termination rights both protect authors and prevent them from
engaging in effective
effective estate planning. To harmonize the law of copyright
copyright and
the law of donative transfers, the tax
tax law should be revised to provide
provide that
termination
tennination rights do not provide adverse transfer tax outcomes. Only when the
tax law is changed will the interests of copyright
copyright owners truly be served.

completion rule to transfers to grantor retained annuity trusts or qualified personal residence
residence
trusts).
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